# Public Works in the Context of HIV/AIDS

Innovations in public works for reaching the most vulnerable children and households in east and southern Africa

**Anna McCord** 





A study conducted by the Public Works Research Project of the Southern African Labour and Development and Research Unit (SALDRU), in the School of Economics at the University of Cape Town for the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author, and are not necessarily endorsed by UNICEF.

This report, together with a the key regional and international documents relating to public works and HIV/AIDS, and the matrix of public works programmes which provided the source material for the report are available on both the SALDRU Public Works Research Project website www.cssr.uct.ac.za/saldru\_pwp.html and www.unicef.org.

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#### **ACRONYMS**

ARVs Anti-retroviral drugs

CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere

CBO Community Based Organisation

CBPWP Community Based Public Works Programme

CFW Cash for Work

CFSTF Community Food Security Task Force

CRIMP Central Region Infrastructure Maintenance Program

CRS Catholic Relief Services

C-SAFE Consortium for Southern African Food Emergency

CSB Corn Soya Blend
DAC District AIDS Council

DCCP Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
DFID Department for International Development (UK)

DHS Demographic and Health Survey

EBFSSN Employment Based Food Security Safety Net

EBSN Employment Based Safety Net ECD Early Childhood Development

ECCD Early Childhood Care and Development EDRP Emergency Drought Recovery Project

EIP Employment-intensive Investment Programme

EGS Employment Generation Scheme

EGS Employment Guarantee Scheme (Maharashtra State, India)

EOS Enhanced Outreach Strategy
EPWP Expanded Public Works Programme
ERRA Ethiopian Rural Roads Authority
ESAR East and Southern Africa Region

ETB Ethiopian Birr EU European Union

FBO Faith Based Organisation

FFA Food for Assets
FFP Food for Peace
FFT Food for Training
FFW Food for Work

FSTF Food Security Task Force

HBC Home Based Care

HCBC Home Community Based Care

HIV/AIDS Human Immune Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

IASC Inter Agency Standing Committee
IDS Institute of Development Studies
IGA Income Generating Activity

IGPWP Income Generating Public Works Programme
IEC Information Education and Communication
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
I-LIFE Improving Livelihoods through Food Security

ILO International Labour Organisation

MEGS Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme

MERET Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transition to More Sustainable

Livelihoods

MK Malawi Kwacha

MTT Mobile Task Team on the Impact of HIV/AIDS on Education

NAC National AIDS Council

NDPPS National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Strategy

NGO Non Governmental Organisation

NPDPM National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management

ODI Overseas Development Institute
OVC Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PIM Programme Implementation Manual

PLWHA People living with HIV/AIDS PWP Public Works Programme

PSNP Productive Safety Nets Programme
RAPI Rapid Assessment of Poverty Impacts

REST Relief Society of Tigray

SALDRU Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit

SCF Save the Children Fund

SPLIFA Sustainable Productive Livelihoods through Inputs for Assets

SRM Social Risk Management
SSP Social Support Project
TASAF Tanzania Social Action Fund

TFA Training for Assets

TFDA Targeted Food Distribution for Assets

UCT University of Cape Town

UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on AIDS UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations' Children's Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Aid

VCT Voluntary Counseling and Testing

WFP World Food Programme ZAR South African Rand

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#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This report examines the social protection role of public works programmes in the East and Southern Africa region, in terms of their ability to address the needs of OVC and households affected by HIV/AIDS. It explores whether public works have a role to play in addressing the massive social protection challenges arising as a result of the high HIV prevalence rates in East and Southern Africa, and the growing incidence of OVCs.

The report reviews how public works programmes have adapted in response to the challenge of HIV/AIDS in Southern and Eastern Africa, and the innovations and programme developments which this challenge has stimulated. The report outlines the general social protection function of public works programmes, and then gives an overview of public works programmes around the region which have attempted to respond to the challenge of HIV/AIDS and OVCs, and also to the need for sustained livelihoods development in order to promote adequate social protection outcomes.

A public works HIV/AIDS typology is developed on the basis of the regional overview, which identifies six different approaches to addressing HIV/AIDS through public works programming, comprising;

- Programmes offering generalised employment, and therefore indirect benefits to HIV/AIDS affected households and/or OVCs
- Programmes offering employment to HIV/AIDS affected households
- Programmes offering a free distribution of wage food/assets to vulnerable labour constrained households and/or OVCs
- Programmes offering service provision for HIV/AIDS affected households and OVCs
- Programmes linking public works employees to HIV/AIDS support interventions
- Programmes including Information, Education and Communication (IEC) activity, including social mobilisation and peer education

Each of these innovations is explored in detail, with case study examples from around the region. After this, a range of key factors impacting on the potential of public works programmes to achieve their social protection objectives are discussed. Finally, issues of cost effectiveness and evaluation are considered, before conclusions and recommendations are presented on the role of public works as social protection instruments for supporting OVCs and those affected by HIV/AIDS. Throughout the region, lack of monitoring and evaluation renders discussion of impact problematic, and lack of disaggregated public works budget information renders discussion of cost effectiveness equally difficult.

In the light of this, conclusions regarding the role of public works instruments to address social protection in general and the needs of OVC and households affected by HIV/AIDS in particular are necessarily inconclusive. However, from the evidence available, and drawing on international experience, it can be concluded that as generally implemented, public works may not be a cost effective means of delivering social protection to vulnerable groups, compared to alternative approaches such as direct cash transfers. However, if appropriately designed, (producing assets of real and sustained socio-economic value, linked with complementary HIV and social development initiatives, and taking into account the innovations currently being developed in the

region such as an expansion of public works into social, as well as physical infrastructure), public works offer the opportunity to provide employment and sustained social protection gains within the region, while also addressing critical social and developmental needs. Beyond this, international agencies have a key role to play in the meaningful integration of HIV/AIDS into public works programmes at a national level, by promoting links between public works and the network of HIV/AIDS service providers available in each country.

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## 1.INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC WORKS, SOCIAL PROTECTION, OVCS AND HIV/AIDS.

From a wide range of possible social protection interventions, public works remain a popular option throughout Africa and the rest of the world, as a response to both acute and chronic poverty, despite a growing debate questioning their impact on sustainable development and social protection.

Within the East and Southern Africa region in particular, public works play a central role in social protection. An indication of the scale of public works in the region is given by the Ethiopian Employment Generation Scheme (EGS), the largest national programme in terms of numbers employed. The EGS provided employment for an average of 5 million workers each year over the last ten years, rising to 13.4 million in 2003. In Malawi, in response to the 2005 food crisis, WFP distributed 83,000mt food using public works, the equivalent to double the entire WFP food intervention in that country in 2004. In Zimbabwe, public works represent the only mechanism to get food to large sections of the poor as free food distributions have largely been suspended, and in South Africa, public works form one of the main government social protection strategies for the working age poor.

This preference for public works based social protection systems throughout the region is matched by significant levels of donor and government spending. The national public works programme in South Africa (Expanded Public Works Programme, or EPWP) has a budget of \$500 million per annum, funded from government sources, with additional support from DFID and the ILO, while the new Ethiopian national public works programme (Productive Safety Nets programme, or PSNP) has an annual budget of \$200 million, funded primarily by multilateral donors. Even localised donor funded public works projects in the region have large scale budget allocations, with the USAID Improving Livelihoods through Food Security (I-LIFE) programme in Malawi having a budget of \$10 million over 5 years, and the EU Income Generating Public Works Programme (IGPWP) in the same country having similar budget of \$12.5 million over 5 years.

Public works function well in terms of providing temporary social assistance in the context of acute or cyclical problems, but recent programme experience and analysis is suggesting that they may be less effective in terms of achieving social protection objectives in the context of chronic poverty, and may not be the most appropriate policy choice (Keddeman 1998, McCord 2005). Despite recent challenges to their effectiveness, as conventionally designed, public works continue to be implemented for a number of reasons, including their consistency with the dominant development ideology which eschews 'dependency' and the 'welfarism' of direct transfers, and the fact that they involve the production of assets, thereby avoiding the perceived trade-off between productive investment, and expenditure on welfare. Hence in the light of their continued popularity as a mainstream social protection instrument, the question becomes whether public works have a role to play in addressing the massive social protection challenges arising as a result of the extremely high HIV prevalence rates in East and Southern Africa, and growing incidence of OVCs, and what that role might be. Can public works contribute to the incorporation of responses to HIV/AIDS into the existing social protection packages offered by donors and governments? What role, if

any, do public works have to play in the lexicon of social protection options available to policy makers to ensure the needs of OVCs and households affected by HIV/AIDS are met, and how might they be redesigned to address these needs?

These are the questions this report sets out to address, reviewing how public works programmes have adapted in response to the challenge of HIV/AIDS in southern and eastern Africa, and the innovations and programme developments which this challenge has stimulated.

Having outlined the methodology used to guide the research, this report then goes on to review the concept of social protection and its relationship to public works in general, examining the key factors which determine its effectiveness as a social protection instrument. Next the relationship between public works and the social protection needs of OVCs and those affected by HIV/AIDS are reviewed, and a summary of the main trends in public works and HIV innovations explored, derived from a matrix of public works programmes in the region (a summary of this matrix is included in Appendix 1, and the full version is available on the SALDRU website and attached CD). From this, a typology of public works interventions addressing the social protection needs of OVCs and PLWHA is developed and discussed, which contains six main types of public works innovations. Each of these is then explored in detail, with case study examples from around the region. After this, a range of key factors impacting on the potential of public works programmes to achieve their social protection objectives are discussed, which are common to all types of programmes. Finally issues of cost effectiveness and evaluation are discussed, before conclusions and recommendations are presented, on the role of public works as social protection instruments for supporting OVCs and PLWHA.

#### 2. METHODOLOGY

The public works component of the UNICEF ESAR Social Protection Research Project was implemented by the Public Works Research Project in the School of Economics at the University of Cape Town (UCT). The research was led by a labour and social protection economist, with the support of a small team of research assistants.

The research was divided into two phases. The objective of the first phase was to prepare an inventory of Public Works Programmes throughout the region, and to identify from the inventory, those programmes designed to impact on social protection relating to OVCs and households affected by HIV/AIDS. The regional public works programme inventory was primarily based on literature and web research, and interviews carried out by the research team at UCT. This initial research identified almost three hundred current or recently completed public works programmes within the region, ranging from small scale local NGOs projects, to large scale national and regional programmes. While this inventory was not comprehensive, it offered insights into a range of highly diverse public works programme designs and implementation modalities, with very different social protection objectives. From this inventory, ninety eight public works programmes were identified which attempted to offer some form of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> www.cssr.uct.ac.za/saldru\_pwp.html

social protection for households affected by HIV/AIDS and/or OVCs. The key components of these programmes are outlined in a matrix contained in Appendix 1. Within these programmes, six main approaches in terms of addressing HIV/AIDS and OVCs were identified, and a typology of public works programme HIV/AIDS/OVC interventions was created. The typology is outlined in section 4.1, and the findings of the regional overview are discussed in section 4.2 below.

In the second phase of the research a detailed study was made of examples of each of the six programme types identified in the typology of public works programmes, drawing on examples from four case study countries in the region; Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe. These countries were selected due to the large number of innovative programmes which were operational within their borders, and also in order to ensure that a range of economic, political and labour market contexts were represented, and the full range of programme outputs, (physical, social and human asset creation) examined.

The case study research involved a literature review relating to the selected programmes, and a country visit during which interviews were held with implementing agencies, donors and social protection agencies. The objective of the case studies was to identify and document key lessons learned, both positive and negative, with a view to sharing key programme conceptualisation and design issues, and creating a public works resource for social protection actors. The research only entailed limited evaluation or discussion with programme beneficiaries, relying instead on programme documentation and pre-existing evaluation documentation. Key electronic and hard documentation was gathered in order to create a public works reference resource for programme planners, implementers and evaluators, which is available on both on the UNICEF and SALDRU websites.

Interviews were also carried out with the multilateral agencies actively engaged in public works funding programming, and social protection policy development.

#### 3. PUBLIC WORKS AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

#### 3.1 Definition of Public Works

For the purpose of this research Public Works Programmes have been defined as:

all activities which entail the payment of a wage in return for the provision of labour, in order to i) enhance employment and ii) produce an asset, with the overall objective of promoting social protection. This includes Food for Work (FFW), Cash for Work (CFW), and the relatively new concepts of Food for Assets (FFA), and Food for Training (FFT).

Public works may be considered a particular form of conditional grant, with the transfer being given in return for the performance of the work requirement. Traditionally, public works programmes offered either food or cash in return for physical labour, and were known as either Food for Work (FFW) or Cash for Work (CFW) depending on the commodity forming the wage, which was paid in return for a given task or number of

hours of labour on physical infrastructure construction or rehabilitation programmes. Food for Work was particularly popular in the post-war period largely due to the major grain transfers available from the US, under Public Law 480,2 which were widely used to support Food for Work programmes around the world. In recent decades, Cash for Work has been the preferred option where possible, as it offers a more responsive and flexible option for recipients, which can be used to meet a range of household needs directly, rather than requiring a process of household level monetisation.<sup>3</sup> However, WFP and USAID still primarily offer Food for Work, with USAID offering food drawn from the Food for Peace (FFP) allocation from US surplus agricultural production. More recently, WFP have shifted to the use of the term Food for Assets (FFA), and also Targeted Food Distribution for Assets (TFDA), in order to encourage a shift in the way the work requirement is conceptualised. These terms (FFA and TFDA) are intended to indicate that food is being given in order to assist communities in the production of assets which will be of economic value to them, rather than food being payment for an arbitrary work requirement, which may or may not be of economic value to the community. In another development, some programmes offer food as an incentive for participation in training activities, in which case the term Food for Training (FFT), is used, expanding the concept of public works still further, and moving away from the traditional work condition to training conditions which are more likely to promote human capital development.

While the term Employment Generation Scheme (EGS) is frequently used to describe employment generation programmes, it should be noted that this acronym is also used for the well known and much documented Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in Maharashtra state in India, a programme which differs significantly from conventional employment schemes in guaranteeing a certain number of days work to the unemployed (the Maharashtra EGS offers 100 days of work each year to unemployed work seekers in rural areas of Maharashtra province).

It is important at this stage to draw a distinction between two significantly different forms of public works programmes, both of which are widely implemented in the region. The primary objective of the first form of public works programme is the construction of assets. In such programmes, labour based techniques are used in order to promote the absorption of increased amounts of labour for each unit of asset constructed. The work of the Ethiopian Rural Roads Authority (ERRA), and the ILO's Employment-Intensive Investment Programmes (EIPs) which promote the use of labour based techniques in the infrastructure and construction sectors are typical of this type of intervention. In such programmes the social protection benefits are secondary, and generalised in their impact, which are often temporary, since programmes are not designed explicitly to maximise these benefits. In the second form of public works, it is the social protection outcome, or the payment of the wage transfer, which is the primary objective, rather than the construction of infrastructure itself. Despite the common name shared by these two sets of interventions, these programmes differ significantly in terms of the balance of their emphasis, with the former concentrating on the production of an asset to certain prescribed standards, and the latter focusing on providing work opportunities to satisfy the work requirement central to the functioning of public works as a social protection instrument. Many public works programmes fall

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> PL480, also known as the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, or Food for Peace, is the U.S. policy of using surplus production to supply the world's largest global food aid programme, which in 2003, had a total value of US\$2 billion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Selling of food aid by households on the local market in order to acquire cash for the purchase of non-food household inputs.

somewhere between these two types, and the relative balance of each of the two priorities results in significant differences in programme design and social protection outcome. Lack of clarity on the relative importance of these objectives leads, in many instances, to the failure of a programme to attain either outcome satisfactorily. It is the public works programmes that explicitly prioritise social protection which are the main focus of this study, although there is some discussion of programmes wherein asset creation is primary, since they form an important set of interventions in the region.

#### 3.2 The Social Protection Function of Public Works Programmes

#### 3.2.1 Social protection

Social protection is a response to vulnerability, which is a function of exposure to shocks or negative processes, mediated by a household's resilience to those shocks. Social protection is the attempt to promote the protection and accumulation of assets in order to reduce vulnerability. Social protection describes all initiatives that: provide income (cash) or consumption (food) transfers to the poor; protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the excluded and marginalised (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004).

The key components of social protection are defined in the World Bank Social Risk Management (SRM) framework as; risk coping, risk management and risk reduction. These components conform broadly with the social protection terminology of protective, preventive and promotive or transformative social protection developed by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004). Social protection benefits may be conferred through three main vectors in public works programmes;

- Wage transfer (cash, food or inputs)
- Asset benefits
- Training or work benefits

Integrating these three vectors into the three levels of the SRM or social protection discourse provides a useful framework for examining the social protection function of public works, see figure 1.

Figure 1: A Conceptual Framework for the Social Protection Function of Public Works

World Bank SRM	IDS T	erminology	Public Works Intervention		
Risk Reduction		Promotive/ transformative (Social transformation)	Productive assets	Wage transfer, meaningful assets (& training skills transfer)	
	Springboards				
Risk Mitigation	<b>=</b>	Preventive (Insurance mechanism)	Sustained employment/ employment guarantee at times of need	Wage transfer	
	Safety nets				
Risk Coping		Protective (Social assistance)	Short term employment	Wage transfer	

Derived from Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004).

In this figure, the World Bank concepts of coping, mitigation and reduction are equated with the concepts of protective, preventive and promotive/transformative social protection respectively. Safety nets comprise interventions which promote coping/protective and/or mitigation/preventive outcomes, while the term 'springboards' may be used to describe interventions which promote mitigation/preventive and/or reduction/promotive/transformative outcomes.

These categories are useful in terms of identifying different types of public works outcomes, with different programme interventions corresponding to different social protection outcomes. For example, a public works programme which offers only short term employment with no sustained benefits accruing from the assets created would confer only protective social protection (social assistance), which would promote a household's capacity to cope with risk, in this short term. The instrument to achieve this would be the wage transfer (food or cash). If employment were offered on a sustained basis, or were guaranteed in times of need, as in the MEGS, with no sustained benefits accruing from the assets created, a programme would confer preventive social protection, or risk mitigation, representing a form of risk insurance. Here again, the wage transfer would be the vector of assistance. If however sustained employment/employment guarantees were offered, and programmes created productive assets, promotive or transformative social protection, would be conferred, described by the World Bank as risk reduction. It is only in this last scenario that there is the potential for public works to provide sustained social protection benefits and poverty reduction in the context of chronic poverty and unemployment. This illustrates the critical importance of i) the economic and labour market context, ii) the duration of employment, iii) the wage level, and iv) the nature of the assets created through public works in determining the social protection impact. Each of these will be examined below in order to clarify how programme design impacts on social protection outcomes.

#### 3.2.2 The economic and labour market context

Public works programmes may be implemented in a range of contexts, which may be grouped into two broad labour market and development situations; i) acute falls in labour demand or livelihoods disruption (e.g. drought, or flood), which may also be experienced in the form of seasonal food security crises, and ii) chronic high levels of under or unemployment and poverty. In the case of the former, the immediate social protection objective would be asset protection and consumption smoothing, with the assets produced serving either to mitigate future risk, promote the livelihoods of workers and/or other community members, and/or enhance development objectives of the broader society. In the latter, the immediate social protection goal would be to facilitate accumulation through sustained employment income (and in some cases labour market potential), while also creating livelihoods promoting assets, which again may be of livelihoods relevance to either the immediate, or wider community. In each scenario, the effectiveness of a public works intervention is contingent on the duration of employment, and the extent to which it enables asset protection, (in the case of an acute intervention), and asset accumulation, (in the context of chronic poverty and unemployment), to take place.

#### 3.2.3 The duration of employment

Employment in conventional labour based infrastructure creation public works programmes tends to last for a period of two to four months only. International experience suggests the social protection benefits arising from short-term public works programme employment may be limited to the period while the wage transfer is taking place, and so for the majority of public works employees, the transfer will only be for

an extremely limited duration. While this is not problematic in the context of an acute period of unemployment, a single short-term episode of employment in a public works programme is unlikely to have significant sustained social protection outcomes in the context of chronic poverty and unemployment, or cyclical unemployment. If a sustained social protection outcome is desired in this context, a medium- to long-term intervention is required which will enable consumption smoothing and accumulation in the form of assets and/or savings. This is a critical insight into the limitations of shortterm public works as an instrument of social protection, and a challenge to the assumptions of much of the public works policy discourse in the region. Evidence from the Zibambele programme in South Africa suggests significant benefits in terms of material and financial asset ownership, human and social capital improvements, and perceptions of sustained poverty reduction. These benefits resulted from a programme with relatively low remuneration but greater employment security and, most importantly, extended employment duration. These findings are consistent with the international literature on public works, which highlights the importance of sustained employment for addressing the challenge of chronic poverty, see for example, Dev (1995), who argues that the sustained duration of wage income is more important than the gross wage transfer, in terms of its social protection outcome.

It is the risk insurance function of sustained employment which can offer a preventive (SRM) or risk mitigation function, and enable the accumulation of assets. The critical need is for public works employees to be able to acquire the 'minimum or threshold asset bundle that enables future accumulation' (Carter, 2004). Unless the poor can accumulate sufficient resources to pass a critical asset threshold, they are very likely to fall back into poverty (Carter and May 1997; Carter 2004 etc). Hence the social protection challenge is to 'create enabling conditions such that people can use time and markets to improve their well-being (and/or that of their children)' and in this way 'crowd-in' private accumulation (*ibid*). This is unlikely to happen if accumulation can only occur over a short period of time, as is typical in the short-term employment periods of employment offered conventional labour-based infrastructure creation public works programmes. Programmes focusing on the maintenance of physical infrastructure or the provision of social services offer a greater opportunity for an extended period of wage transfer, and therefore increase potential for accumulation to cross the critical asset threshold.

The World Bank agrees that short-term public works are appropriate only where poverty is transient or cyclical, (in which case the intervention must be repeated), and that if poverty is chronic, there is a need to offer ongoing, rather than temporary employment, for public works to perform a social protection function. See for example Datt and Ravallion (1994) and Subbarao *et al* (1997):

'failure to obtain this work [public works employment] whenever needed will tend to undermine the social insurance function of public-works schemes' (Datt and Ravallion 1994:1358)

'in countries where poverty-gap ratios are high, the need to run the program year-round (and thus raise transfer benefits to the poor) assumes greater importance)' (Subbarao *et al* 1997:84)

In the context of a country seeking sustained medium- to long-term employment opportunities in a public works programme, the development of social sector

employment opportunities may be of particular value, for example in the areas of Early Childhood Development (ECD) and Home Based Care (HBC), as discussed in section 8.

#### 3.2.4 The wage level

Second to the duration of employment, in terms of the general social protection impact of public works programmes, is the wage level, as this is the primary vector of social protection support accruing from participation in the programme. A higher wage will confer a greater social protection benefit on the worker than a lower wage. However, this is frequently overlooked by those designing public works programmes, and a depressed wage, often below the market norm, is frequently adopted in public works programmes with the intention of targeting the poor, despite the adverse social protection implications of offering such a wage. The negative consequences of using a depressed wage have recently been empirically established (see, for example, Barrett and Clay 2003), and are discussed further below in section 11.2.

Low wages are often adopted in public works programmes in an attempt to promote self-targeting by the poor, rendering programmes unattractive to the less poor. This is based on the premise that the work requirement and low wages, conventionally set at or below the prevailing wage, lead to an outcome in which the poor self-select themselves into the programme, leading the World Bank to assert confidently that;

'They [public works programmes] can easily be self-targeting by paying wages below market rates.' (World Bank 2001:155)

This assumption is prevalent in the public works literature, see for example Subbarao *et al*:

'The best way to ensure that the program reaches the poor is to maintain the program wage at a level no higher than the ruling markets wage for unskilled labor' (Subbarao *et al* 1997:77)

and

'maintaining a low program wage ensures that participation rates are low, attracting only the poorest to work sites' (*ibid*: 78).

Evidence from Kenya has been used to support the argument that where the wage is increased, non-poor inclusion errors also increase (Teklu 1994), and similar arguments have also been made on the basis of findings from the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS), where non-poor participation increased significantly after the upward revision of the public works wage (Ravallion, Datt and Chaudhuri 1993). Hence it is assumed that by the adoption of a low wage rate, the poor will select themselves into programmes, while the less poor will find such programmes unattractive and not seek to participate. This supposed ease of targeting is therefore a major factor in the selection of public works over alternative social protection instruments.

However, a number of studies suggest a significant degree of participation by the non poor, (or the less poor) even in the context of 'sub market' wage rates, which challenges this assumption (for example McCord 2004b; Barrett and Clay 2003). Programme evaluations repeatedly indicate participation by those who may not be

classed as among the poorest, for whom the intervention was intended. The theory of self-targeting should preclude this, providing the wage is sufficiently low, but Barrett and Clay (2003) argue that this premise is conditional on a perfectly functioning labour market, which is frequently absent in the contexts where public works programmes are implemented. They suggest that the value of labour varies considerably within and between households, depending on the amount of labour available in the household and access to productive assets such as land. This variation in the value of labour renders public works employment at a given wage attractive to surplus labour in less poor households in some cases, as a form of supplementary income, yet unattractive to poorer households with limited access to labour, even with public works wage levels at or below the prevailing wage.<sup>4</sup>

A wage set at an extremely low level may be contrary to the social protection objectives which were the initial rationale for programme implementation. This analysis is particularly relevant in a segmented labour market where the prevailing wage in the most poorly paid sector is extremely low, as in the *ganyu* (informal agricultural contract labour) system in Malawi. Despite falling below subsistence level, this wage was used to guide remuneration in the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) public works programme, which in 2004 was set at MK36/day (US\$0.30), which is just sufficient for a worker to feed himself for one day, rendering any potential household level social protection impact extremely limited. Replicating this wage level in a public works programme is problematic, since it is unlikely to have a significant impact on chronic poverty and creates a tension within a programme with the objective of providing social assistance or addressing chronic poverty.

The assumptions underlying the self targeting function of a low wage in public works programmes are currently coming under attack from a range of theoretical perspectives which take into account the imperfections of the labour market, and institutional barriers to programme participation. For example Pellisery (2005) and Scandizzo, Gaiha and Imai (2004) draw similar conclusions regarding the illusory nature of effective self targeting in public works programmes in South Asia in the context of imperfect labour markets with fluctuating wages, and high public works entry and exit costs.

#### 3.2.5 The vectors of social protection benefits from public works

As discussed above, there are two main vectors through which public works programmes confer their social protection benefits; the wage transfer which is direct, and the indirect benefit from the asset created. In addition, some programmes offer training or skills development as a third vector of benefit. Each of these is discussed briefly below.

#### 3.2.5.1 Wage benefits

The wage is central to all public works programmes. This represents a direct benefit and may be offered in the form of cash, food, or material inputs, such as fertilizer.

Typically, the wage is the priority vector of social protection benefits, with asset production and the work requirement functioning primarily as a rationing and targeting mechanism, as in the case of the Employment Generation Scheme (EGS) in Ethiopia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This theoretical analysis confirms empirical programme evaluation findings, such as the review of the DFID funded Sustainable Productive Livelihoods through Inputs for Assets (SPLIFA) public works programme in Malawi, which found non-poor participants from labour rich households self selecting into the programme despite extremely low wage levels, DFID 2004, unpublished.

The fundamental goal of the EGS, which averaged five million beneficiaries per annum, was to keep households from starvation, by offering a minimal safety net. In this instance, the prioritisation of the wage transfer was appropriate, as the programme did not have more elevated social protection aspirations. In such cases, wage is the only vector of social protection. In this context, the value of the wage, frequency of payment, form of wage, and duration of employment are the critical determinants of whether the public works programme will have a successful social protection outcome. The impact is significantly enhanced if employment is prolonged and other complementary social development interventions are implemented with the same population (e.g. savings clubs, microfinance, income generation training etc) as in the CRIMP programme in Malawi and the Zibambele programme South Africa, which offer these additional inputs to enhance the potential benefit of the wage transfer. Without such additional inputs, short-term wage transfers alone are unlikely to have a significant or sustained impact on either poverty or livelihoods in the context of chronic poverty, with the impact limited to one of a temporary insurance function to prevent or reduce further distress asset shedding and impoverishment.

The wage rate will critically relate to context, and programme objectives, although often the desire to prevent either labour market distortion or inclusion errors, results in wages being kept low, even when social protection outcomes are desired, fundamentally undermining the potential impact of the programme. As evidenced by the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) public works programme, however, an excessively low wage (US\$0.30 in 2004) can undermine the social protection function so severely that social protection benefits from programme participation may be acutely limited, and engender limited potential for accumulation of movement out of poverty, resulting in a programme which offers only a basic protective or risk coping, social protection function. It is interesting to note that a wide divergence of wage rates was found in some countries, ranging five-fold from MK43 to MK200 (US\$0.36 to US\$1.67) per day in different programmes in Malawi in 2005, while in others with strong central government, such as Ethiopia, widespread adoption of the state norm lead to consistency across nation and among NGOs, who conform to centrally determined employment standards, at ETB 6 per day (US\$0.75). Reluctance to offer higher public works wages lest they distort the national or local labour market was particularly evident in World Bank supported programme, such as the Malawi and Tanzania Social Funds, (MASAF and TASAF) despite the fact that the scale of public works employment and great numbers of the under and unemployed render this very unlikely. In the case of MASAF, this concern led to extremely low wage levels unlikely to have a significant social protection impact. The critical insight emerging from this is that if the wage rate is not adequate to enable workers to accumulate assets and cross the poverty threshold, (as discussed in Carter 2004), such a programme is likely only to replicate the problem of adverse incorporation in the existing labour market at extremely low rates of remuneration, rather than offering social protection response.

It is also important to note that the seasonality of public works employment is critical in instances where social protection needs are associated with periods of cyclical unemployment of food gaps. The critical issues here are employment and timely payment during the period of need; payment delays are a common and highly significant factor in undermining the potential social protection benefit of the wage transfer. It is also important that programmes are designed to be sensitive to periods of alternative employment opportunities for the poorest, or periods when labour is required for domestic production activities, so that the cost of income or labour foregone, does not undermine household food security, or next season harvest prospects. Since

immediate consumption needs tend to be prioritised over investment in activities which will promote future consumption (e.g. engagement in domestic production), among the destitute and labour constrained, there is a risk that current participation in a public works programme for cash or food income may reduce labour investment in own production for the next season, to the detriment of household food security in the medium term.

If the wage is the only vector of social protection, it is likely that a public works programme will be an inefficient choice of social protection instrument. The reason for this is that wage typically comprises between 30 and 70% of the total cost of a public works programme, implying a 30 to 70% delivery charge, in the form of management, administration, technical inputs and material inputs. This high delivery cost is likely to be appropriate if the output (asset created) has an intrinsic social or economic benefit to the community. However, if the asset is only significant as a means to absorb labour in order to satisfy the work requirement, and does not offer significant socio-economic benefits to the community, public works programmes represent an extremely costly form of social protection. For a full discussion of the cost effectiveness of public works see section 12 below.

#### 3.2.5.2 Asset benefits (physical, social and human capital)

#### Physical capital

Historically the construction of physical assets or infrastructure, and to a lesser extent the maintenance of that infrastructure, has been the 'product' of public works programmes. Such programmes dominate in the region, with the majority of public works programmes offering feeder road construction and rehabilitation as their main output, followed by the repair and construction of small scale irrigation systems. Construction of the physical infrastructure required for service provision, particularly schools, clinics is also a relatively common output, together with the construction of community gardens and management of environmental resources such as forests and water sources. Typically physical infrastructure programmes offer short-term employment, with a small number of residual medium- to long-term employment and livelihoods opportunities occurring through the maintenance or ongoing resource management and harvesting.

In some programmes, the physical assets output of public works programmes are part of a strategic national objective, as in the New Deal in the US during the 1930s, whereas they may alternatively be assets to promote community development or may focus on individual asset creation. Each of these interventions would have very different anticipated social protection impacts, and there are critical questions associated with such interventions, such as: to whom does the asset accrue, is it a private or public asset, is it strategic or arbitrary, is it linked to other assets, how is the asset maintained and sustained, does it generate actual economic benefits? Responses to these questions are varied throughout the region, and will have a significant impact on social protection outcomes.

Some programmes even extend their reach to an attempt to create markets. An example of this would be the Sustained Productive Livelihoods Inputs for Assets (SPLIFA) programme in Malawi, which offered wages in the form of vouchers to purchase agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilizers) with the aim of stimulating the creation of rural agricultural input markets. Likewise the new Ministry of Transport public works road programme in Malawi is intended to provide participants with a wage sufficient to enable the purchase of fertilizers at subsidized rates, in response to a

concern that even subsidised fertilizers were out of the reach of the majority of the population. In this programme, the wage rate was set in relation to the price of fertilizer, rather than any subsistence or social development calculations, resulting in a rate five times greater than the Social Fund public works programme operational in the same districts.

It is often assumed that developmental outcomes will accrue from asset creation, particularly physical, but the limited research which has been carried out in this area suggests that in some instances, these expectations may not be realised, once the asset is in place. For example a sociological study in Limpopo South Africa suggested that few of the anticipated benefits of a rural road, such as reduced prices, increased transportation, increased access to services and markets, occurred, since construction of the asset alone may not be sufficient to stimulate social and economic changes (Mashiri and Mahapa, 2002). In general, there is inadequate monitoring of the impact of physical assets. Monitoring and evaluation often has very short time horizons, and may rely on assumptions of 'accelerated' development of market and social processes, which may not be realistic. For example in the SPLIFA programme, it was assumed that one season of fertilizer inputs through public works would be sufficient to enhance production in a sustained way, and stimulate the development of markets. There are many other instances of exaggerated expectations of what can be achieved through one off short-term public works intervention, and these persist as public works are often not subject to the same scrutiny as other social protection interventions.

In some cases, the physical outcome is itself the primary objective of the programme, using labour based methods as a cost effective or socially preferably form of production. Examples of this would be the Ethiopian Rural Roads Authority (ERRA) construction programme, which uses labour based methods for economic reasons, due to the relative cheapness of labour compared to capital in Ethiopia. In other more developed countries, the labour/capital cost ratios shift and the fundamental economic rationale for using labour based approaches may not be so strong. In South Africa, for example, recent research suggests there may be a slight (approximately 10%) premium for the production of assets using labour rather than capital based techniques (Taylor, McCord and van Seventer, 2005). Other examples of public works programmes where the physical outcome is central to the conception and execution of a project are the Working on Fire and Working for Water programmes in South Africa, which attempt to address genuine socio-economic problems (destructive field fires, and agricultural degradation arising from alien species such as water hyacinth respectively), using labour based techniques.

However, these programmes are unusual in as much as their medium-term socio-economic outcomes are considered as central. In the majority of public works programmes, the quality and durability of assets created, as well as their strategic and socio-economic relevance is frequently overlooked. In others, these concerns are explicitly overlooked, as in the case of the recently launched Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia, where the urgent need to absorb 5 million people with chronic livelihoods deficits during the 2005 hungry season, overrode the programme objective of creating quality infrastructure, with quality issues being relegated to secondary importance in relation to the need to provide protective, risk-coping transfers. In many instances, it is the act of employment in asset creating activities, rather than the socio-economic viability and functioning of the assets created, which is critical. This fundamentally undermines the likelihood of sustained indirect, secondary

social protection benefits arising from public works, since the quality of assets created under such programmes is likely to be inferior.

A tension between the creation of viable assets and social protection is apparent in many programmes. This is illustrated by the frequent adoption of a cap on spending on non-wage costs in public works programmes (management, technical inputs, material inputs etc), which can undermine the quality (and socio-economic value) of assets created. Examples would be roads created without the requisite bridge infrastructure (due to the high capital cost of bridge construction) in the MASAF programme, or the poor quality infrastructure created under the EGS in Ethiopia.

The quality and viability of physical assets created has implications for the cost effectiveness of public works as instruments of social protection. Frequently a premium is associated with the adoption of labour based technologies, and this is only acceptable if i) there is a social protection benefit, and ii) the asset created is of adequate quality and will confer socio-economic benefits.

#### Social capital

However, recent innovations in public works programming have seen the concept expand to include a greater range of assets, including social infrastructure. Just as conventional public works address the need for physical infrastructure provision, innovative programmes are recognising the unmet need for social infrastructure in communities driven by the challenge of HIV/AIDS. The increased demands on existing social infrastructure in communities facing high levels of HIV/AIDS is illustrated by increased demands for horizontal welfare transfers among the poor, with HIV/AIDS placing pressure on traditional coping mechanisms whereby households are mutually dependent at times of idiosyncratic shocks. With high prevalence levels of HIV/AIDS, such local mutual informal insurance systems are coming under increasing strain. Likewise, traditional coping mechanisms whereby households take responsibility for orphaned or vulnerable extended family members are increasingly stretched by the high number of orphans resulting from the pandemic, and dependency ratios (the number of non-economically active household members dependent on those of working age) are increasing to unsustainable levels. In this context, the priority infrastructure need may well be social rather than physical, and a shift in the nature of public works interventions has started to occur in response. Public works programmes in which workers are paid (or given cash, food or in kind incentives) to provide Home Based Care (HBC), or Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) are responses to such a situation, with examples being the Red Cross's Home Based Care Programmes in Zimbabwe and Malawi, and the Working for Water ECD programme in South Africa. In these social sector programmes, the key concepts of public works are present, working in return for remuneration in return for the provision of labour to create an asset. It is the nature of the asset, social, rather than physical which is the innovation in these cases.

#### Human capital (training and skills development)

Public Works have also developed a third variant in recent years, with the use of food as an incentive for 'work' or 'training' which involves the accumulation of human capital assets, either with the objective of promoting livelihoods skills of direct beneficiaries, as in the forestry component of the Income Generating Public Works Programme (IGPWP) of the Government of Malawi and European Union, or of developing a core set of skills and knowledge (e.g. HIV/AIDS prevention, mitigation and

care) within a community. This forms a third type of public works asset creation, human, in addition to the physical and social assets outlined above.

There is a great range in the detail of programmes offering training and skills development. Some programmes require work, and offer training as an additional benefit, such as the Expanded Public Works Programme in South Africa, while others offer food or cash in return for participation in training exercises, often in the form of incentives, and food provision at training courses. Some training is technical on-the-job training in the skills required to perform the job, some training in more generalised 'lifeskills', some based around acquiring skills to support the community in a social capacity for future programme employment, such as training in HBC, and some based on practical training to promote individual livelihoods, such as income generation, agricultural production or forestry. The value of this form of benefit depends crucially on the quality of the training offered, and its relevance given the nature of the labour market. Sometimes the poorest are excluded from more technical forms of training due to illiteracy or innumeracy, as in under the EPWP in South Africa, where the illiterate are excluded from the Department of Labour based vocational training programmes.

Demand for labour is critical in determining the effectiveness of formal training programmes; skills-side strengthening is only relevant if there is a matching demand for those skills. This is a problem in the South African EPWP; skills-training is theoretically at the heart of the programme, but only limited skills transfer is possible within the time constraints of the programme which allows for an average of only 6-10 days of training per worker. As a consequence, skills benefits may be negligible in the context of mass unemployment among the low and unskilled. The result of such a programme is likely to be the churning of unemployed, moving out of unemployment into a short-term public works programme and then being deposited back into unemployment. Concerns about the non-viability of public works programme exit strategies in the context of chronic unemployment have led to some programmes periodically suspending exits for a period, and to prolonged public works employment, as in the case of Working for Water in South Africa during the early 2000s.

In contexts where formal sector employment opportunities are limited, training interventions such as income generation may be more appropriate, as in the CRIMP or IGPWP programmes in Malawi. It is clear that skills training may confer only limited social protection benefits unless skills are created in areas where labour demand exists, or the training creates additional informal sector employment.

#### 3.3 Programme Design Implications

From the discussion above, it is clear that for public works programmes to function as social protection instruments, they must be designed to suit the particular poverty and labour market context within which they are to operate. Their success in promoting social protection is contingent on the duration of employment, the wage level, and the nature of the assets created under the programme. These assets may be physical, social or human in their nature, and may or may not themselves confer social protection benefits on participants or the wider community. In the context of chronic poverty, one off programmes are not likely to be effective, and programmes without links to other forms of social development interventions are not likely to offer sustained benefits.

Recognition of these key design considerations has led to changes on public works programme design in recent years, for example the multiple year Government of Malawi/EU Income Generating Public Works Programme (IGPWP) and USAID funded Improving Livelihoods Through Food Security (I-LIFE) programmes in Malawi explicitly recognise the need for sustained support in order to allow secondary benefits and multipliers to take effect, learning from the shortcomings of previous one season interventions such as SPLIFA. This need for multiple year investments to promote sustained social protection benefits and to enable transformative processes to occur has also informed the development of the multiple year PSNP in Ethiopia, which was inaugurated in 2005.

It has also been recognised that in order to have a sustained promotive or transformative social protection impact, linkages with complementary development initiatives and other inputs to improve livelihoods are critical. This need to link public works with other development interventions has informed the development of the PSNP in Ethiopia, the Zibambele programme in South Africa and both the I-LIFE and IGPWP in Malawi, each of which is explicitly linked to interventions which promote increased productivity, and value chain improvements. This represents an implicit recognition that the implementation of public works programmes in isolation is unlikely to have a significant or sustained social protection impact, in the absence of broader developmental processes.

### 4. PUBLIC WORKS, SOCIAL PROTECTION, OVCS AND HIV/AIDS

There is an inherent limitation to the social protection function of conventional public works programmes in the context of high HIV/AIDS prevalence, given the requirement of labour input in return for the social protection transfer. For this reason, public works programmes are problematic in terms of the support they offer to labour constrained households, which includes many with OVCs and those with HIV/AIDS affected members, which are often labour constrained due to domestic demands of caring, and the loss of labour to sickness and death. Public works programmes tend to exclude those who are not able bodied and as a consequence, in the absence of alternative or complementary interventions, social protection based on the provision of public works employment will necessarily exclude some of the most needy and labour constrained households.

HIV/AIDS has a negative impact on labour availability within the household in several ways; the absolute amount of labour in the household is reduced due to death, the amount of labour available per working age adult is reduced due to illness, increased domestic caring activities and funeral attendance, and the quality of available labour is decreased due to illness. For all these reasons, social protection instruments which require labour inputs from beneficiary households are problematic in the context of HIV/AIDS.

Hence if public works programmes are the primary or only social protection instrument in an area, it is critical that some direct unconditional support such as a direct food or

cash transfer is included for those facing labour constraints and unable to participate (see section 7 for a full discussion of this issue).

#### 4.1 The Typology of Programmes Addressing OVCs and HIV/AIDS

Notwithstanding the limitations of conventional public works programmes in terms of explicitly assisting OVCs and households affected by HIV/AIDS, a listing of public works programmes in the east and southern Africa region which are attempting to adopt innovative approaches to address this challenge was derived from the inventory of three hundred public works programmes identified in the first phase of the research. Out of the inventory of public works programmes identified in the region, one third took issues relating to HIV/AIDS and or OVCs into account in their design. These programmes are summarised in matrix form in Appendix 1. While the matrix is not exhaustive, it is indicative of the range of current innovations in the region responding to the challenge of HIV/AIDS.

From the matrix, a typology of public works programmes addressing HIV/AIDS was developed, which identified six vectors for the transmission of social protection benefits to OVCs and households affected by HIV/AIDS;

- Programmes offering generalised employment, and therefore indirect benefits to HIV/AIDS affected households and/or OVCs
- Programmes offering employment to HIV/AIDS affected households
- Programmes offering a free distribution of wage food/assets to vulnerable labour constrained households and/or OVCs
- Programmes offering service provision for HIV/AIDS affected households and OVCs
- Programmes linking public works employees to HIV/AIDS support interventions
- Programmes including Information, Education and Communication (IEC) activity, including social mobilisation and peer education

Each vector is outlined briefly below, and explored in detail in sections 5 to 10.

#### 4.1.1 Indirect benefits

In this category of programmes, any benefit accruing to those affected by HIV/AIDS or OVCs occurs as a consequence of whatever public good is created for the broader community, and any positive externalities arising from this. Such programmes involve vulnerable groups only indirectly as a sub-set of the broader benefiting community. Whether OVCs and HIV affected households will benefit from such interventions will be a consequence of their level of integration into the social and economic networks of the community, and their ability to provide the labour required to benefit, for example, from improved access or irrigation. Programmes with no explicit consideration of HIV/AIDS affected households or OVCs, fall into this category. For the purpose of this study this vector will be considered as offering no substantive benefits to this group. Most of the public works programmes reviewed fell into this category.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> It should be noted that the initial inventory was not exhaustive, and in many cases the data available was limited. In addition some of the projects included in the inventory are components of broader programmes also included in the inventory, which risks the double counting of some initiatives.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> A higher percentage of programmes may actually include consideration of HIV/AIDS and OVCs in their programmes, but Appendix 1 includes only those programmes which refer to these issues in publicly available documentation.

#### 4.1.2 Employment

Public works employment may be targeted directly at HIV positive workers, or at members of their households, or households with OVCs. In this case, the vector of social protection benefit is the wage income accruing from the employment. The sustainability of such support is contingent on the duration of employment, with prolonged employment offering a greater likelihood of accumulation and sustained benefits.

Where the HIV positive are directly targeted for employment, either a reduced workload is sometimes introduced for those who are physically weak, in the case of conventional physical infrastructure construction programmes, or special low input activities are developed as the basis of the programme, such as bee keeping or low intensity horticulture. In the latter case the assets created are often private rather than public goods, and are aimed directly at promoting the livelihoods of affected households. In some cases, household contracts are made, whereby if a worker falls ill or dies, other family members are entitled to substitute themselves for the worker, thereby avoiding loss of household income.

In order to protect household welfare at a time when workers may be unable to work due to illness or death, some programmes offer contracts to households, rather than only one worker, so that alternates may work in their place. In one public works programme demanding skilled labour inputs, there has been a pilot to train two workers in a household for every one required (Working for Water in South Africa). This has cost implications, but allows households the security of continuing income, even at times of sickness and death.

The household contract system can also allow the main worker to take temporary additional or alternative employment in order to maximise household income, without loosing the security of the public works programme employment, further reducing risk, and increasing opportunities for diversification.

#### 4.1.3 Free distribution to those unable to work

While labour based public works conventionally target the able-bodied, they sometimes include a free distribution for poor and/or labour constrained households. Such programmes retain a portion of the wage goods, (food or inputs such as seeds or fertilizers), for households which are unable to participate in a work programme due to a lack of labour. Vulnerable households without members of working age, or with chronically ill members are usually the target for such a distribution. Female and child-headed households may be explicitly targeted, but 'HIV affected' is rarely a criterion, with the broader term 'chronically ill' or 'unable to work' being used more frequently, in deference to the stigma frequently associated with HIV, the lack of testing facilities in most of participating communities, and in order to avoid the danger of 'AIDS exceptionalism'. Typically this group of beneficiaries will comprise ten to twenty percent of total public works beneficiaries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> 'AIDS exceptionalism' occurs when those rendered vulnerable due to their HIV/AIDS status are treated differently from, and sometimes given support which is not offered to, other similarly vulnerable people, whose vulnerability stems from different causes. This can lead to the stigmatisation of those affected by HIV/AIDS, and sometimes resentment towards this group.

#### 4.1.4 Service provision

A recent innovation in public works is the inclusion of programmes which offer some form of service to those affected by HIV/AIDS or OVCs as one of the 'assets' created in return for the public works wage. Such programmes may entail the direct provision of social services such as Home Based Care (HBC) or Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD), and may also include voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) and other services for those affected by HIV/AIDS, as well as direct food transfers, compensating for the increasingly untenable demands made on community support mechanisms under the pressure of the pandemic. This work may be complemented by the development of CBOs with the capacity to utilise and allocate the services funded through the public works programme.

The construction of the physical infrastructure required to deliver social services to OVCs and those affected by HIV/AIDS, such as clinics and schools, also represents a contribution of conventional public works to reducing access constraints faced by the vulnerable. In addition, a public works programme may provide physical infrastructure in the form of private assets for households affected by HIV/AIDS, such as specially designed and easy to use 'kitchen gardens' or vegetable plots, or larger school gardens where the product of the garden may be used to raise funds for students, or to ensure adequate school nutrition.

#### 4.1.5 Linkage to HIV/AIDS support interventions

In some programmes, the institutional structure offered by the public works programme itself is used as a means to channel resources to OVCs and those affected by HIV/AIDS among programme employees and their families. In such situations, programme managers actively integrate locally available support services and initiatives into the public works programme in order to benefit workers and their households. Here interventions by a range of CBOs and FBOs are central, as is the role of the local branches of the NAC, and as well as the activities of agencies offering VCT and promoting the roll out of ARVs. In these situations, it is the linkage of public works programmes with the key agencies offering support and other services such as food, material or medical assistance which is key.

#### 4.1.6 Information, education and communication (IEC)

Both formal and informal HIV/AIDS Information Education and Communication (IEC) campaigns are often associated with conventional public works programmes, alongside social mobilisation and peer education initiatives. These may comprise informal HIV/AIDS awareness activity with the drivers of the fleets of vehicles transporting the food wages, or communication campaigns with workers at food or wage distribution points, benefiting from the access which these activities offer. More innovatively, some Food for Training (FFT) programmes use food as a wage for community activists trained in IEC around HIV/AIDS prevention and care, who then work with the broader community on awareness around these issues. In this instance, the programme is contributing directly to human capital development.

#### 4.2 Regional Public Works Programme Design

The spatial distribution of recent or current programmes falling within this typology within the region is set out in the table below.

<sup>8</sup> Kitchen gardens are small household vegetable plots built in the vicinity of the home.

Table 1: Distribution of Types of Public Works Intervention in ESAR

Vector of Social Protection Impact	Countries with Public Works Programmes of this Type
Indirect benefits to HIV/AIDS affected households	All
Employment for HIV/AIDS affected	Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa,
households	Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Free distribution of wage food/assets to	Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia,
vulnerable labour constrained households	Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda,
and/or OVCs	Zambia, Zimbabwe
Social service provision for HIV/AIDS	Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho,
affected households and OVCs	Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania,
	Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Linking public works employees to	Burundi, Malawi, South Africa
HIV/AIDS support interventions	
IEC - including social mobilisation and peer	Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho,
education	Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa,
	Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia,
	Zimbabwe

The table indicates that the range of programme options are spread throughout the region, with concentrations of innovative programming in certain countries. Political and/or ideological considerations on the part of governments or major donors are the major influences on the type of programmes selected.

The frequency of each programme type is set out in table 2 below. Out of the 94 programmes in the inventory, IEC was the most common form of HIV consideration, being included in almost half of the programmes, with free distribution being included in one third, and direct employment for HIV/AIDS affected households and service provision in one fifth of programmes, reflecting the recent emergency of such innovative programmes in the region, for example under the C-SAFE initiative. Likewise, links to HIV service provision were only included in 7% of programmes. Although programmes offering indirect support to those affected by HIV/AIDS dominate in the overall inventory of public works programmes in the region, the number of such programmes included in the HIV/AIDS inventory is limited, since most programmes offering this support do not explicitly mention HIV/AIDS in their documentation. Hence only a small number of 'indirect' programmes have been included in the inventory.

Table 2: Frequency of Programme Type

	Indirect	Employment for HIV affected	Free Distribution	Service Provision	Links to HIV Services	IEC
Number	4	19	30	22	7	46
%	4%	20%	32%	23%	7%	49%

n=94 (Total adds up to 136% due to some programmes including more than one programme type).

Table 3 indicates that programmes predominantly offer food as the mode of payment, reflecting the dominance of USAID and WFP in public works programme funding and management. Food is also the exclusive mode of payment where training (human capital development) is the anticipated outcome. This also reflects innovation among agencies with exclusive access to food, which are attempting to expand the range of activities which can be supported using food as the primary input.

Table 3: Mode of Payment and Output

	Food for C Work		Agricultural Inputs for Work	Food for Training	
Number	54	42	1	5	
%	57%	45%	1%	5%	

n=94 (Total adds up to 108% due to some programmes having more than one component).

Wage levels vary significantly both within countries and across the region, with diverse and sometimes contradictory political and economic considerations guiding the selection of the wage level. For the 25 programmes for which wage information was available, the findings were varied, with some programmes reporting the wage in relation to the prevailing wage level, and some in relation to the minimum wage, see table 4. It is interesting to note for two thirds of programmes, the wage is set at or above the prevailing or minimum wage, and that only one third of programmes set the wage at less than the minimum wage or prevailing wage. Although the sample size is small, this indicates that the majority of programmes are not following the traditional principle of 'less eligibility', which selects a low wage in order to make public works employment unattractive, but are instead considering household consumption needs, as the basis for wage selection (see discussion in section 11.2). This is likely to be due to the large incidence of WFP supported programmes in the region, which offer a wage determined by household food requirements, rather than a wage determined by prevailing labour market remuneration. The value of a household ration is often greater than the prevailing or minimum wage in the region due to the surplus rural labour supply.

Table 4: Wage Level

	Less than Prevailing Wage	Equal to Prevailing Wage	Less then Minimum Wage	Equal to Minimum Wage	Above Minimum Wage
Number	1	5	8	5	6
%	4%	20%	32%	20%	24%

n = 25 (27% of programmes).

Within the region the average duration of employment was six months, ranging from 2 weeks to 4 years, and the average female public works participation rate across the region was 53%, although it varied from only 10% in some programmes, to 93% in programmes which deliberately targeted the poorest and most vulnerable households.

#### 4.3 Summary of Public Works Programme Design and Impacts

Figure 2 summarises the key design choices discussed in this chapter which are the major determinants of social protection impact of public works programmes on households affected by HIV/AIDS and OVCs.

NATURE OF LIVELIHOOD CRISIS Public works programme required to address acute or cyclical full in labour de mand (asset protection and consumption smoothing) \* Chronic Public works programme required to promote social development through sustanined employment (facilitating accumulation) and/or creation of livelihoods promoting assets (physical or social goods) PROGRAMME DESIGN CHOICES SOCIAL Duration PROTECTION Wage Level IMPACT Single/Multiple Year ON Link with Developmental Processes ovcs AND HOUSEHOLDS AFFECTED BY VECTOR OF SOCIAL PROTECTION HIV/AIDS IMPACT **¥** Wage Asset (Physical or Social Capital) \* Training (Human Copital) VECTORS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION IMPACT ON HIV/AIDS AFFECTED HOUSEHOLDS AND OVCS Indirect benefits generalized employment Employment to HIV/AIDS affected households Free distribution of wage food/assets to vulnerable labour constrained households and/or OVCs Linking public works employees to HIV/AIDS support interventions. Information, education and

Figure 2: Determinants of the Social Protection Impact of Public Works Programmes on Households Affected by HIV/AIDS and OVCs.

#### 4.4 Case Studies Reflecting Typology and Regional Trends

communication (IEC) activity, including social mobilization and peer

education

On the basis of the public works typology and key design factors impacting on the social protection impact of programmes identified in this chapter, and the distribution of programmes throughout the region, four case study countries were selected, and the major public works programmes in these countries were reviewed in some detail. These countries encompassed a range of programmes and contexts, which together illustrated the six main programme approaches identified in the typology above. The

countries examined in more detail are Ethiopia, Malawi South Africa, and Zimbabwe, and the key programmes reviewed in each country are listed in table 5.

Table 5: Key Programmes in Case Study Countries

Country	Name of Programme	Type of HIV/AIDS Response		
Ethiopia	Productive Safety Nets Indirect benefits Programme (PSNP) Complementary distri			
Malawi	Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF)	Indirect benefits IEC		
	Improving Livelihoods Through Food Security (I-LIFE)	IEC		
	Income Generating Public Works Programme (IGPWP)	Linkages with HIV/AIDS support interventions		
	Malawi Red Cross HBC Programme	Service Provision		
	World Food Programme Targeted Food Distribution for Assets (TFDA)	Complementary distribution		
South Africa	Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP)	Service Provision IEC		
	Working for Water	Service Provision Employment Linkages with HIV/AIDS support interventions		
	Zibambele	Employment Linkages with HIV/AIDS support interventions		
	Gundo Lashu	IEC Linkages with HIV/AIDS support interventions		
Zimbabwe	C-SAFE Food for Work Programme for those affected by HIV/AIDS Affected (CARE & World Vision)	Employment Service Provision		
	Zimbabwe Red Cross HBC Programme	Service Provision		

The programmes listed in table 5 form the basis of the detailed discussion of the public works typology in chapters 5 to 10 below.

## 5. PROGRAMMES OFFERING GENERALISED EMPLOYMENT

This chapter will discuss programmes which offer generalised employment, and therefore indirect benefits to HIV/AIDS affected households and OVCs. The majority of public works programmes fall into this category, and Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), and its predecessor, the Employment Generation Scheme (EGS), will be used as case studies, since these programmes have been the focus of much

analysis and redesign in recent years in order to promote their social protection effectiveness, in an attempt to move from temporary 'social assistance social protection outcomes, to promotive and transformative social protection outcomes. The lessons learned in the EGS and applied in the design of the PSNP are of relevance throughout the region, and illustrate the key factors required for successful social protection outcomes from public works programme.

The Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia and EGS, are examples of public works programmes which address the social protection needs of OVCs and PLWHA through their membership of the broader community, on the basic assumption that where a household benefits from participation in a PWP, the children in that household will also benefit. Children's social protection needs are not addressed in isolation from the household unit, which is the basis for support in public works interventions. Children are considered in the context of their household's vulnerability, and the PSNP will in theory provide a ration for all members of participating households, if sufficient labour is supplied, conditional on sufficient resources being available for distribution. Where households are labour constrained, children are eligible for rations under the direct support component of the PSNP, although this again depends on the adequacy of food or cash resources available in a given woreda (district). As a result of concerns regarding the comprehensiveness of an EGS or PSNP based safety net, UNICEF has developed a complementary programme for children, the Enhanced Outreach Strategy (EOS). The EOS aims to provide additional social protection provision for children whose households may have been excluded from PWP participation, or for whom the transfers resulting from participation were too limited to bring about child welfare benefits.

The PSNP however represents a critical development in thinking around public works in relation to sustained transformative social protection outcomes, which is also apparent in other countries around the region. The PSNP explicitly recognise the fact that annual one-off public works programmes, such as were administered in Ethiopia for more than twenty years, are not an effective tool in terms of addressing social protection, livelihoods or poverty. This realisation has also been made in Malawi, where a recent report argued that;

'mitigating shocks will not lead to economic growth. Years of safety net programs that treat the symptoms of food insecurity, for instance by providing temporary food, cash or inputs, have done little or nothing to reduce vulnerability to future risks. Links with development programming have not been adequately formed' (CARE Malawi, 2004:13).

The critical question is how public works programmes can be incorporated into a social protection strategy which addresses sustainable development, and enables participants to cross the critical threshold of asset accumulation such that they are able to sustainably reduce the risks to which they are subject and the depth of poverty they endure. Only if this question is addressed, are public works able to have a sustained social protection impact on vulnerable members of communities supported through public works. SOS Sahel in Ethiopia has terminated its public works programmes, after a decade, and is instead focusing on the whole production value chain, (including production, diversification and marketing), seeing public works employment and investment in asset production as one component of a broader strategy for sustainable improvements in livelihoods and transformative social protection. Likewise in Ethiopia, Save the Children UK are experimenting by delivering public works employment

alongside a range of complementary developmental and service delivery inputs in their Legambe programme.

#### 5.1 Public Works Policy in the Productive Safety Net Programme

Large scale public works programmes were incorporated in the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Strategy (NDPPS) in 1989, which drew heavily on the Indian Famine Code. This strategy was replaced in 1993 by the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM) which gave a central role to the development of a national Employment Generation Scheme, (EGS) which it defined as 'labour intensive public works schemes, planned in a participatory manner, utilising relief resources and targeted towards the able bodied sectors of vulnerable communities.' During the 1990s, there was a shift from FFW (Food for Work, Food for Recovery, Food for Development) to EGS, which national policy differentiated from FFW, arguing that unlike FFW, EGS has predominantly relief objectives, while development is subsidiary.

This policy was replaced in 2004 by the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP), a five year food security programme, which attempted to address chronic rural food insecurity, reorienting the national public works programme towards developmental outcomes. Under the new programme, the terminology of public works has shifted from EGS plus gratuitous relief for the non able-bodied, to PSNP plus direct support.

The PSNP also governs the activities of the many NGOs implementing public works in the country, whose programmes are required to be consistent with government run programmes and adopt PSNP modalities, such as prioritising cash, limiting the number of transfers which do not have a work requirement, and conforming to the PSNP pay conventions. Both current and past NGO-implemented public works programmes have attempted to introduce innovations and complementary components to enhance the impact on public works on food security in general and OVCs in particular.

The PSNP represents the culmination of several years of programme learning and redesign, and attempts to address the limitations of a public works programme implemented in isolation from other complementary development initiatives. Government programmes dominate public works in Ethiopia in terms of the scale of employment provided, offering an average of 5 million food insecure beneficiaries public works employment each year over the last decade. Many of the major donors support the national programme directly with financial aid (including the European Commission, CIDA, DFID, and DCI), but others, such as USAID work autonomously, supporting NGOs such as CARE and CRS which implement public works programmes alongside the government programme, in geographically targeted areas. USAID provides food rather than financial support, and hence these programmes, while governed by most the national public works criteria, tend to offer food rather than cash transfers. Other donors, for whom the changes envisaged in the PSNP are no sufficiently radical in terms of their livelihoods orientation, are funding independent innovative public works pilots such as the Save the Children UK Meket and Legambe programmes, which conform to the national public works norms, but include additional complementary components, to promote livelihoods, and include action research programmes.

The PSNP is a three to five year programme, which forms one segment of the larger Food Security Programme managed by the Food Security Coordination Bureau under the

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. The programme includes two components, a labour-intensive public works component, and a component which offers 'direct support' or transfers to support households are labour constrained, have no means of support and are chronically food insecure. The rationale for the new programme is that the previous emergency oriented approach was hindering efficiency. Hence the new programme represents a shift to attempt to address structural /chronic food insecurity, with the goal of moving to predictable programming with predictable resources, and using public works as one component of an integrated national food security strategy. The role of the PSNP within the national Food Security Programme is illustrated in figure 3 below.




Figure 3: The National Food Security Policy in Ethiopia

The objective of the programme is 'to provide transfers to the food insecure population in chronically poor insecure *woredas* (districts) in way that prevents asset depletion at the household level and create assets at the community level'. Simultaneously the programme will support rural development, prevent long-term consequences of acute short-term consumption shortages, promote household production and investment and promote market development by increasing purchasing power.

The new programme was developed in response to a critique of the previous programme and key new innovations planned within the programme which reflect the desire to shift from relief to development orientation are i) a move from food to cash as the means of payment, ii) an improvement in the strategic importance and quality of the assets created, iii) integration with other developmental initiatives, and iv) multiple year employment, with the broad objective being to increase the opportunity for workers to

'graduate' out of chronic food insecurity, as the result of a range of interventions implemented under a wider food security programme, including the PSNP.

#### 5.2 Principles Underlying the PSNP

The PSNP was developed through a dialogue between the Ethiopian government and the donors, and was designed in response to a number of insights into the reasons for the perceived failure of previous public works programmes which had been identified. The key insights informing the revised programme design were: i) the need to integrate a public works programme with line ministries and other development initiatives, ii) the importance of considering cash distribution in place of food where appropriate, iii) the need for improved quality and sustainability of the assets created, iv) the removal of capacity constraints to performance, v) the need for a sustained intervention, and vi) the need to have projects on the shelf for implementation as necessary in order to ensure work was available for all those in need. These concerns offer insights to the reasons for the frequent failure of public works programmes throughout the region to achieve significant impacts on livelihoods and poverty, and are discussed in detail below.

The principles underlying the PSNP are valid for public works programmes throughout the region, and are set out in figure 4, and are relevant to the successful design of public works throughout ESAR.

Figure 4: The Principles Underlying the PSNP Public Works Component

Labour based:

Works must be labour-intensive and use simple tools as much as possible. Public works sometimes can be supported by machinery if it is essential for the work. The ration of labour to capital inputs should be flexible at *woreda* (district) level and activity level. At *woreda* level, the ration can be up to 20%. At activity level, the ration can be even higher and depends on technical specifications of each project.

Participation:

The community participates in the selection, planning, monitoring and evaluation of projects.

Predictability:

Public works are provided through a multi-annual resource framework.

Targeting:

A combination of administrative and community targeting is used to identify able bodied poor insecure households who can participate in the programme.

Proximity:

Public works are provided as much as possible in the immediate localities of the people in need.

Integration:

Public works are integrated into *woreda* development plans and planned on an intersectoral basis

Complementarity:

Public works must not compete with agricultural activities or voluntary work *Gender sensitivity:* 

Public works are designed to enable women to participate, and priority is given to works which reduce women's regular work burden.

Source: PSNP Project Implementation Manual

#### 5.2.1 The integration of public works with development initiatives

There is a need to integrate public works programmes with other development initiatives. The importance of integrating public works programmes with the activities of other line ministries and other development initiatives is one of the key learning points from the failure of previous public works programmes in Ethiopia, and internationally. When implemented in isolation from other interventions, public works are unlikely to have a sustained impact on livelihoods or poverty, and their impact may be limited to the period of direct transfer.

In Ethiopia, this failing has been formally recognised in the Food Security Programme, which explicitly states the need to implement complementary interventions, such as agricultural extension, alongside public works, if sustainable livelihoods outcomes are desired, with the medium- to long-term goal of 'graduation out of poverty'. This programme recognises the limitation of short-term asset protecting interventions, in terms of long-term development outcomes. It also recognises the inefficiency of multiple government agencies working in parallel, with the associated duplications of effort and efficiency losses, particularly in an environment where both resources and local administrative and executive capacity are severely limited.

The need for complementary inputs is being addressed in several NGO programmes, including the REST public works programme, which is distributing seeds and fertilizers, promoting new crops including high value horticultural crops, and providing credit and agricultural inputs (on a loan basis). In this way, potential positive economic benefits arising from the construction of infrastructure assets through the public works programme can be captured and used to promote livelihoods, contrary to previous experience, where asset creation has often had limited if any linkage to livelihoods improvements. The World Bank is actively promoting agricultural diversification on a similar basis in its programmes. Zeal to recoup cost of developmentally oriented loans in association with the EGS however, led to further impoverishment in some cases, where the inputs purchased under the loans had not led to the anticipated increases in productivity, due to factors such as adverse climatic conditions. This observation provides a powerful note of caution to an approach based on credit based provision of inputs in a chronically drought prone region.

While the FSP, REST and World Bank approach focuses on promoting productivity through complementary interventions, SOS Sahel is addressing value chain inputs, in recognition of the frequent failure of increased productivity to translate into improved livelihoods. SOS Sahel is implementing pilot programmes which address production, processing and marketing in order to strengthen the link between increased productivity and improved livelihoods. The organisation implemented public works programmes during the 1990s, but has now shifted out of public works, having completed an excellent review of its public works in Wolaita, (2002), which contained an insightful critique of the (limited) impact of public works and articulated many of the design problems addressed in the PSNP. The insight that production chain development is critical in terms of realising the potential benefits from asset creation and increased production is a critical one, often overlooked in public works interventions.

Responsibility for PSNP implementation has been moved from an autonomous agency, operating outside the management structure of the government at federal, provincial and local level, to the Ministry of Agriculture and Development, in an attempt to integrate the work of the public works programme with other government interventions

and in this way to promote synergy and promote the strategic relevance and impact of public works. While the benefits of such integration are clear, one major drawback resulting from the integration is the introduction of significant bureaucratic delays in transfer delivery. Equally the new programme management arrangements do not take advantage of the experience of mass food/cash delivery built up in the previous agency. In the context of an emergency based public works programme, whose inputs are required for the physical survival of participants, the drawbacks of rapid shift to a new, integrated implementation structure may well outweigh the benefits, at least in the short term.

#### 5.2.2 The creation of good quality assets to improve productivity

It has been widely acknowledged that EGS projects were hastily planned, and often only partially completed, poorly maintained, and not productive. In addition, the limited public works budget allocations to non-wage items further undermined the quality and viability of assets created, in some instances leading to the work requirement being waived entirely (see Subbarao and Smith, 2003). The creation of poor quality assets is found in a number of public works programmes throughout the region. Many assets created, such as stone bunds, offer only limited economic benefits in and of themselves, without the requisite associated agricultural inputs and extension services. In some instances, marginal land has been converted to nominal agricultural land in order to absorb public works labour, but without positive agricultural outcomes, resulting in what some observers have characterised as 'public works playgrounds' which absorb labour, but are unlikely to have a significant beneficial livelihoods impact on households or wider communities. In such programmes, employment and immediate welfare objectives clearly dominate the asset creation and longer term livelihoods objectives.

The PSNP has explicitly attempted to address this limitation, and to promote the livelihoods aspect of the programme, by introducing quality conditions that are verified prior to project approval and implementation. However, the focus on the quality of work is having a detrimental impact on the immediate welfare outcome. Programming delays resulting from a lack of capacity to develop appropriate quality projects, and payment delays resulting from the lack of local government capacity to verify the quality of work carried out is leading to delays in programming and payment. Hence the quality requirement was a major constraint on the safety nets impact of the programme, creating a bottle-neck in terms of the roll out of the programme and the number of workers employed under the PSNP was far below the 5 million requiring food security assistance. As a consequence, in order to ensure adequate coverage under the PSNP, the work requirement was suspended, and three month advance payments given to workers in order to avert a food security crisis. This illustrates the tension between emergency and developmental objectives in public works programmes, between survival and livelihoods. In attempting to address quality issues to promote the livelihoods impact of the programme, the basic social protection impact was compromised, and since this must necessarily dominate in an emergency context, the quality issues were sacrificed.

It is not clear whether the exigencies of social protection needs in the context of a chronic food deficit situation will allow a rapid shift to a more developmentally oriented programme, as envisaged under the PSNP, given the need for improved planning, technical assistance, resources for non-wage incomes, institutional coordination, and community ownership required for an effective livelihoods programme. In the first year

of the PSNP, the need for the rapid distribution of emergency aid has dominated the objective of quality improvements. Given the context, it is not clear that this shift can be made, throughout the country, in the short term.

#### 5.2.3 A multiple-year intervention

Under the EGS, an annual appeal was launched for the substantial donor resources required to fund the EGS, based on the number of anticipated beneficiaries in need of social protection each year. However, in recognition of the fact that over the last decade an average of five million people have required assistance each year (the trend is upwards year on year), and given that at least this number of people may confidently be assumed to require social protection in an average year, it was agreed between the government and donors to fund the PSNP on a multiple three to five year basis. In this way, both donors and the government are able to improve their financial planning and budgeting processes as a result of increased fiscal predictability, offering major efficiency gains to both parties, and this aspect of the PSNP has gone ahead without major problems.

The predictability and multiple year approach also has the potential to impact positively on beneficiaries in terms of assuring them secure and regular transfers over a number of years. This is a key aspect of a successful social protection programme, which aims to provide ongoing inputs during the hungry period, until households 'graduate' out of food insecurity. This insurance function is key to successfully assisting asset accumulation and livelihoods diversification through public works, and may be contrasted with the one-off short-term public works interventions seen elsewhere in the region, which fail to deliver sustained livelihoods improvements. However, delays in implementation arising from capacity constraints and the increased bureaucratisation of the programme have undermined the predictability and insurance function of the PSNP in this season, for the reasons discussed above, and it is unlikely that these will be resolved in the short- to medium-term. Hence the insurance function benefit is unlikely to accrue to participants, for whom the transfer remains uncertain and unpredictable. Also there is likely to be oversubscription for PSNP employment since the number of places available may be less than the number requiring social protection assistance. In the light of this, it is not certain that the same households will benefit over a number of years which further undermines the risk insurance function of the transfer (see discussion of exclusion errors below).

#### 5.2.4 The role of on the shelf projects

Finally, the PSNP recognises the need to have projects 'on the shelf' ready to be drawn down in line with the need to initiate activities to satisfy the work requirement. This 'shelf of projects' concept forms the cornerstone of the massive employment guarantee programme in Maharashtra, India, which formed a model for programmes in Ethiopia, and is essential if the programme is to be sensitive and respond rapidly to increased demand for food security in a bad year. However, as discussed above, technical and administrative skills constraints, and bureaucratic problems have meant that such a shelf of strategic, pre-designed and approved projects does not exist in most *woredas*, further contributing to the delay in rolling out the programme, and undermining the social protection function of the programme.

#### 5.2.5 The removal of capacity constraints

Financial, administrative and technical capacity constraints within the government structures with responsibility for implementing the programme were the key factors

hindering implementation of the more demanding objectives of the PSNP. This situation is exacerbated by the limited resource allocation to capital inputs within the PSNP. The 20% capital cost and administration limit represents a serious challenge to the construction of appropriate and quality infrastructure, and tends to lead to the selection of low cost infrastructure, such as bunds, irrespective of their relevance to local livelihoods or strategic priorities, and often with inadequate capital investment to ensure their quality and sustained usefulness.

Hence the adoption of development oriented outcomes without addressing the significant resource constraints to performance is problematic, particularly in the context of mass food insecurity, where programme delivery, in terms of employment in order to activate the resource transfer in the form of a wage, is critical. There is a clear trade off between the urgency of getting the wage to those in need of social protection, and the quality of the assets produced. Given this trade off is likely to result in the continued production of assets of limited economic or livelihoods value, there is a question as to the appropriateness of selecting public works in preference to an unconditional transfer, and continued use the work requirement as a condition for social protection. In this context, it is political, rather than economic or developmental preferences, which are driving policy choice (see discussion on dependency in section 11.1).

#### 5.2.6 Institutional issues

The predecessor of the PSNP, the EGS was implemented by the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DCCP) with relative autonomy. The DCCP operated as an emergency institution outside the normal constraints of the government, and had the capacity to mobilise food resources and work for 13 million in 2003, with general adherence to the work requirement, although this was flexibly implemented to promote coverage. Under the PSNP, in an attempt to reorient the programme to a sustainable food security approach and promote integration with other developmental interventions, responsibility has shifted to the Food Security Bureau. The rationale for this shift is evident, however, given the diverse mandate of the FSB, incorporating livelihoods diversification and agricultural extension, and the requirement to work through government structures, in collaboration with a range of line ministries, the institutional context is more complex, giving the PSNP less autonomy, and hence slowing delivery. So while developmental concerns are being met, there is a delivery cost to the changed institutional context, which may be problematic if urgent food security transfers are delayed, highlighting the difficulty of shifting to a developmental response in the context of an ongoing emergency. There is a risk inherent in suspending a previous functioning safety net without assurance of functioning replacement, and it is likely that the shift to a developmental response may be at the cost of reduced relief response, unless adequate skills, finance or systems are in place.

# 5.3 The Social Protection Function of Public Works Offering Indirect Benefits

The Ethiopian government has identified some of the key constraints to the effective functioning of public works programmes in terms of making a sustained impact on social protection, in terms of livelihoods and food security, and has attempted to address these constraints in the design of the PSNP. These problems are common to public works programmes which are attempting to address sustained food security and livelihoods objectives throughout the region. The key insights informing design choices

in the PSNP, and the operational difficulties arising from these choices in the context of mass chronic food insecurity are summarised in table 6.

Table 6: PSNP Design Innovations and their Associated Challenges

Programme innovation	Associated Challenge
Integration with line ministries and other development initiatives	Institutional delays in transfer delivery New agency lacks experience of mass food/cash delivery Lacks institutional mandate to operate autonomously (rapidly)
Cash in place of food	Inflation and food access problems in structurally food deficit areas due to underdeveloped market system Lack of infrastructure for cash delivery (cashiers etc)
Improved quality of assets (therefore more likely to be of sustained socio-economic benefit)	Delays in asset identification, design and execution due to limited technical capacity Limited mass employment opportunities Need for additional material, technical and administrative capacity (also constraint under previous programme)
Address performance constraints relating to capacity (financial, material, skills, administrative, technical)	Not all constraints systematically addressed (only financial)
Sustained intervention required for i) government planning and budgeting, and ii) positive impact on beneficiaries of secure and regular inputs  Need on the shelf projects	Donors agree regular transfer, but PSNP does not include all in need Transfer not regular for beneficiaries, due to delays and implementation constraints Lack of capacity to prepare shelf of preprepared projects

In addition to the design problems outlined above, the PSNP also raises a number of insights relating to the role of public works programmes as instruments of social protection, which are of regional relevance. While public works in Ethiopia have successfully provided millions annually with emergency food security support, rising to an all time high of over 13 million beneficiaries in 2003, it is the acknowledged failure of public works to generate sustained improvements in food security and livelihoods over the last two decades which has led to the redesign of programme as discussed above, and the resulting PSNP is attempting to improve the social protection impact of the intervention.

The economic value of the assets created is critical to achieving this change, and the quality of infrastructure generated under previous schemes in Ethiopia, as throughout the region has been widely criticised. Multiple documents question the value of assets produced under the EGS in terms of their impact on promoting livelihoods, often due to constraints of material costs and lack of technical assistance, and primacy of the objective of absorbing large numbers of workers, in line with the need to identify work to justify the wage transfer. As elsewhere in the region, little emphasis is placed on formally evaluating the economic benefits and associated social protection benefits of the assets created under the PSNP, or other public works programmes currently being implemented. This renders assessment of the effectiveness of public works as social protection instruments problematic.

Programmes offering indirect benefits to households affected by HIV/AIDS treat PLWHA and OVCs primarily as members of households. If there is sufficient labour in the household, household members must work in order to acquire the transfer. In these instances the social protection impact is contingent on good public works programme design, in terms of sustained employment, multiple year programmes, adequate wage levels, the appropriate choice of cash or food, and linkage of programmes to complementary development initiatives.

However, the PSNP illustrates the gulf between public works programme design and execution, and the tension that exists between good programme design and the need to meet urgent food security requirements. Improvements in programme design may be compromised by the exigencies of emergency food needs. The need for sufficient technical and administrative capacity for the successful implementation of programmes with transformative social protection goals is clear form the PSNP experience, as is the difficulty of achieving development-oriented outcomes without addressing critical resource constraints. In the context of mass food insecurity, and severe resource constraints, the adoption of a developmental public works programme is problematic.

Other insights arising from the PSNP are that an adequate scale of programme is essential if exclusion errors are to be avoided. This holds true in many other programmes in the region, where the coverage of a programme in an area may be significantly lower than the population in need of social protection in that area, leaving many without support if the programme is the only social protection intervention in an area. The UNICEF Enhanced Outreach Strategy (EOS) in Ethiopia was designed explicitly to address the risks of such a safety net 'gap' arising due to insufficient coverage under the PSNP. Furthermore, it is clear that sustained benefits will only accrue from a public works intervention if participants are able to reach an asset threshold (Carter 2004). Only under these conditions is the aspiration, held by many governments and donors, for workers to 'graduate' out of poverty as a result of public works employment a possibility.

# 6. PROGRAMMES OFFERING EMPLOYMENT TO THOSE AFFECTED BY HIV/AIDS

Several programmes in the region have been designed in recognition of the fact that households affected by HIV/AIDS and those living positively are often excluded from regular public works programmes due to the work requirement. Some programmes offer employment directly to those living positively, while others attempt to extend employment opportunities to households affected by the virus.

# 6.1 The Employment of those Living Positively

Recognising that the HIV/AIDS positive were often excluded from regular FFW programmes, members of the Consortium for Southern Africa Food Emergency (C-SAFE) across the region have developed small projects to assist households affected by HIV/AIDS, using food as an enabler, and attempting to bring those living positively into Food for Works programmes, following guidelines developed under C-SAFE. The

objective of the intervention is to use food aid to address HIV/AIDS by promoting direct employment of those affected by HIV/AIDS, and ensuring that stigma does not prevent them from taking part in public works employment.

In Zimbabwe, where the distribution of a general ration is prohibited except under stringent conditions, and individual Corn Soya Blend (CSB) and oil distributions are only permitted for the chronically ill who have come through clinic referral systems, the only opportunity to access food for PLWHA who are outside the referral system, is through Food for Work. In response to this situation CARE developed Food for Work programmes in which 'light food for work duties' were allocated to the sick (due to HIV/AIDS or other illnesses), which would include child care activities for children whose mothers were working on the project, with payment at the same rate as those carrying out physical labour, or a reduction in task size, (reduced bucket sizes or reduced work norms for the HIV positive). Workers were also trained using 'Food for Training' in low physical impact activities offering the potential for high remuneration such as the construction and use of kitchen gardens or bee keeping, in order for them to supplement their nutritional intake in the medium- to long-term, after programme completion. Similar programmes have been implemented by other members of C-SAFE, in Zimbabwe, including World Vision. The consortium has produced accessible materials on the integration of HIV into food based public works programming, based on the insight that food security and nutrition play an integral part in HIV and AIDS interventions, see box below.

#### C-SAFE

The C-SAFE Consortium is operational in Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and consists of three core NGO members; CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and World Vision, as well as ADRA in Zambia. C-SAFE is a three-year programme initiated in 2003, which was also active in Malawi for the first two years of operations.

Key documents available on the c-safe website, www.c-safe.org, are;

- Food for Assets Programming through an HIV/AIDS Lens. Manual & Checklist
- Adapting Programming to an HIV/AIDS Context.
- Measuring the Effect of Targeted Food Assistance on Beneficiaries with Chronic Illness: Lessons Learned from the Literature and the Field.
- Food Aid and Chronic Illness: Study Insights
- The HIV/AIDS Timeline as a Program Tool

A similar approach was followed by the Working for Water programme in South Africa, which uses teams of trained workers to clear alien invasive plants and experimented with the creation of exclusively HIV positive work teams. Within the programme, a need was identified to ensure that the high morbidity and mortality rates of HIV positive workers would not adversely impact on either the performance of the work team, or the income of participating households. Workers in this programme need significant levels of training in order to carry out their tasks, and the issue of substitute workers was addressed by training alternate workers from each participating household for each HIV

positive person employed. This doubles the training cost, but enables work, and household income to continue uninterrupted even during periods of sickness. This approach is still very much at the experimental stage within the region, and is somewhat problematic in terms of issues such as the stigma attached to HIV disclosure in many countries, limited testing facilities and knowledge of HIV status, and also cost and feasibility if transferred to large scale public works initiatives. With reference to the reduction of work norms for sick workers, it is interesting to note that within the ILO programme in Ethiopia, there have been incidences of contractors requesting a reduction in conventional labour based road construction work norms, due to the poor health status of the workers and their inability to complete conventionally determined tasks, primarily in this case due to malnutrition. In this situation, as with the 'light work duties' for the HIV positive on conventional public works programmes, the question arises, as to whether public works are the most appropriate form of social protection intervention for such vulnerable members of society?

# 6.2 The Employment of Households Affected by HIV/AIDS

The Zibambele Programme, implemented by the KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport in South Africa successfully targets extremely vulnerable labour constrained households affected by HIV/AIDS. The programme employs workers to carry out part-time maintenance on gravel rural access roads, on the basis of one year renewable contracts. The HIV targeting in the programme is implicit, rather than explicit, given the extremely high HIV prevalence levels in KwaZulu Natal and the central role of HIV/AIDS in contributing to vulnerability in the province. The programme uses sensitive community targeting to reach the poorest, who tend to be female-headed and affected by HIV/AIDS, either directly through household illness and death, or through the incorporation of orphaned children into the household.

This group would be excluded from conventional public works employment, due to their limited labour availability and the burden of their domestic responsibilities, however, through sensitive design, employment on the programme is accessible to even severely labour constrained households. The programme offers part-time employment (64 hours, or eight days work per month) and flexible working hours in recognition of the domestic responsibilities of carers. The programme also offers household, rather than individual employment contracts, thereby offering flexibility in terms of allowing alternates to work if i) the lead worker has the opportunity to benefit from temporary or sporadic alternative employment opportunities should they become available, or ii) the lead worker is sick, or passes away. In this way, household incomes may be maximised and the risk of the double livelihoods shock of reduced income and high health care and burial costs if the worker is sick or passes away, is reduced.

Recent research findings indicate that the Zibambele programme has had a major impact on child welfare (McCord, 2004a). Zibambele workers are paid at the minimum wage (ZAR38 or US\$6 per day at the time of the research), but, given the part-time nature of the employment, the monthly total was only ZAR330 (US\$51) per month. Notwithstanding the relatively low level of the monthly wage transfer, its regularity over a sustained period was highly appreciated, and programme participation had a significant impact on both education and nutritional outcomes for children in public works households. The regular participation of all school age children in Zibambele households rose from 67% prior to participation, to 90% subsequently, while the incidence of households regularly reducing children's meal sizes due to the inability to

afford food fell from 34% to 1% subsequent to public works employment. In addition, households with public works employees receiving a wage transfer reported a reduction in activities which caused them shame. The reduction of the need to beg, and the ability to perform the requisite ceremonies to mark the anniversary of family deaths were highlighted as outcomes of the programme, which indicates a reduction in the psycho-social burden of HIV/AIDS.

Closely targeted programmes such as the Zibambele are particularly valuable where a public works programme intervention is only of limited scale, due to either limited funds, or limited infrastructural absorptive capacity. In the absence of such close targeting, and sensitive programme design, public works might otherwise exclude this kind of vulnerable group, who would be poorly placed to compete in an open market for public works employment. However, it is important to note that the accurate community targeting was only achieved due to the significant investment in community mobilisation carried out by the implementing agency, and this was made possible by the sustained nature of the employment offered. In a shorter term employment programme, such investment in the community on the part of the implementing agency would not have been socially or financially viable.

# 7. PROGRAMMES OFFERING A FREE DISTRIBUTION TO VULNERABLE HOUSEHOLDS

As mentioned above, given the work requirement, public works programmes may exclude some of the most vulnerable households which are labour constrained. For this reason some programmes offer a free distribution of food or inputs to vulnerable labour constrained households. The implementation of a complementary distribution for those unable to work is an important and necessary complement to a conventional public works programme. The absence of complementary free food or cash interventions (or some alternative form of social protection) is problematic. If public works are the primary or only social protection instrument in an area, it is critical that some unconditional support such as a direct food or cash transfer is included within the public works programme, for OVCs and those affected by HIV/AIDS who are not incorporated into households participating in the programme. However, research indicates that complementary free distributions only occur in one third of public works programmes in the region (see table 2).

# 7.1 Examples of Programmes Offering Complementary Distribution

Typically programmes providing complementary distributions of food, cash or inputs offer support to the chronically ill and/or households with OVC, rather than explicitly targeting on the basis of HIV status.

The WFP public works programmes in the region tend either to include or be implemented alongside complementary free food allocations, as the distribution of food to all of those in need is the programme's primary aim. The SPLIFA programme in Malawi included a free distribution of the agricultural inputs used as payment for public works employees, to the poorest among those unable to participate in the programme

work, which totalled 10% of the total agricultural inputs allocation. Also, under the Ethiopian PSNP, 20% of the wage budget is allocated for direct transfer to those unable to work (approximately one million people).

Where free distributions are used as a complement to public works-based social protection, it is critical that adequate resource allocations are made for those unable to work. If the allocation is to small, relative to the size of population in need, there is a high risk of exclusion errors, leaving large numbers of those unable to work having no access to social protection inputs. This remains a potential risk within the PSNP.

### 7.2 Failure to Implement a Complementary Distribution

Where no complementary unconditional support is provided, the social protection situation may be problematic. For example, within the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) public works programme, there is an underlying assumption that those unable to work are able to affiliate themselves in some way with those employed in the programme, and hence no additional provision is made for this group. MASAF does include a programme for supporting OVCs and the vulnerable, the Social Support Project (SSP), but this programme is not implemented in coordination with the public works programme, and hence while OVCs or PLWHA may be supported under MASAF in some areas, this support may not be offered in areas where the public works programme is being implemented. The risk inherent in this approach is that the social protection needs of this vulnerable group may remain unmet, even in areas where a social action fund is in theory being implemented. In some instances the failure to implement a complementary programme is the result of donor choices, while in others political or ideological restrictions on free food distribution may limit the potential for complementary distributions in association with public works programmes, as in some of the World Vision public works programmes in Zimbabwe.

Evidence from Malawi and Ethiopia suggests that where alternative sources of support are not provided, children, lactating women, the sick and the malnourished may choose to participate in public work schemes in order to access food or cash. This indicates that alternative sources of support are not available to these groups, and raises the question as to whether public works is the most desirable or appropriate form of social protection intervention to meet the social protection needs of these vulnerable groups, and whether it is morally appropriate to extend the work requirement under these circumstances.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Here it is interesting to reflect on whether an agricultural input is the most appropriate form of transfer for those falling into the category of unable to work, or whether it would be more appropriate to offer a monetised equivalent. There are arguments on both sides, and the decision on such issues will need to be location specific.

# 8. PROGRAMME OFFERING SERVICE PROVISION FOR THOSE AFFECTED BY HIV/AIDS

Within the region public works programmes are providing a range of services to OVCs and HIV/AIDS affected households. These may be grouped as:

- Provision of physical assets related to livelihoods, such as individual or community gardens or school gardens.
- Provision of physical assets related to service delivery, such as the construction of crèches, health centres or ECCD facilities.
- Provision of social services in the form of skilled staff.

The first type of intervention directly targets livelihoods and nutrition issues relating to HIV and OVCs, while the second two attempt to address physical constraints to the accessing of social service support, through the physical construction of infrastructure, and through increasing numbers of personnel offering social services.

The C-SAFE programme has been particularly innovative in recent years in its use of public works to provide services for the vulnerable. In Zimbabwe, the programme grew out of a conventional Food for Work programme, which was redesigned in response to the needs of OVCs and households affected by HIV/AIDS, and is based on the use food as a motivating force to create assets and services for communities and vulnerable groups. The programme is constrained as it can only provide food (due to funding through the USAID Food for Peace Programme), but through innovative programme design has been developed to include the provision of services to the vulnerable. The Food for Work programme currently includes the construction of physical assets to address nutritional and livelihoods needs, and also the provision of physical assets required for social service delivery, such as clinics and health centres, as well as the provision of social services in the form of HBC.

Each form of service provision is reviewed below.

# 8.1 Provision of Physical Assets: Livelihoods

As part of the C-SAFE consortium, both World Vision and CARE in Zimbabwe use community Food for Work programmes to create individual assets such as kitchen gardens for those unable to work due to chronic illness, or for households where elderly grandparents may be struggling to care for OVCs. In some cases, the Food for Work approach is also used to pay those affected by HIV/AIDS to construct their own individual assets, and these workers are then also provided with seeds and other inputs through integration into complementary agricultural programmes in the area. While the payment of individuals to produce assets for themselves is contentious within the public works arena, C-SAFE argue that there is a case for waiving this concern in the context of HIV positive workers.

The gardens created under these programmes require low labour inputs, using either the keyhole garden approach, developed in Lesotho, or trench garden technology to

increase productivity. These gardens are constructed close to homesteads, offering the potential for increased household productivity. Most production is consumed within the household, but where there is a surplus, this is sold to generate income. Food for Work programmes are also used to create community gardens in order to produce output for HIV positive self help groups, and those caring for OVCs, and school gardens which provide food for school nutrition programmes, and a source of cash income to support more vulnerable school children. Other, more conventional physical assets such as dams and irrigation systems are also constructed and rehabilitated under the C-SAFE programme, which are intended to promote agricultural output more broadly within the wider community, and also address the lack of access to reliable water resources which constrained community and individual garden output in the first seasons.

These programmes have not yet been fully evaluated, in terms of the economic or nutritional impact of the gardens and physical assets created. Neither has their cost effectiveness been established, taking into consideration the relative cost of the food produced in gardens in relation to cost of asset creation. A formal cost-effectiveness study of such programmes is particularly problematic since they use imported donated US PL480<sup>10</sup> food, which implementing agencies do not factor into the cost analysis of their programmes.

## 8.2 Provision of Physical Assets: Service Points

The construction of physical community assets which facilitate service delivery, such as clinics, health centres and crèches has long been a component of conventional public works programmes, such as the Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) in South Africa implemented during the 1990s, and Working for Water in the same country has supported the construction of crèches in order to safeguard the welfare of the children of its workers. Members of the C-SAFE consortium are also implementing community asset construction as part of their Food for Work programme in the region. Since the C-SAFE programme is based on the transfer of food assets, communities are required to provide any non-food materials required in the construction process, such as cement, roofing sheets etc, with the critical input from C-SAFE being technical support and community mobilisation, and complementary inputs such as training in Income Generating Activities (IGA) and rural micro-finance and savings. There is a similar situation with WFP Targeted Distribution for Assets (TDFA) projects in Malawi, where wage inputs in the form of food are provided, but all other material inputs must be sourced from the implementing community. The risk here is that asset quality and durability may be undermined by the lack of necessary material inputs. Similar problems relating to the absence of budgetary allocations for material components seriously hindered the asset creation component of the EGS in Ethiopia (see Subbarao and Smith, 2003). Where the mode of payment is food, as for example in WFP or USAID supported programmes, there is a risk of poor quality asset creation unless additional allocations for material inputs are included in the programme.

The key debate associated with the provision of physical assets required for social service provision is whether the physical construction of an asset will necessarily result in improved service delivery. Evidence from South Africa suggests that the creation of social service assets under public works programmes may not always result in improved service delivery, as this is dependent on inter-departmental coordination and integration.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See footnote 2.

The relevant social sector line ministries need to ensure that adequate staffing resources are available, funding for recurrent costs are budgeted, the asset is adequately connected in terms of road access, electricity, water, sanitation etc, and the services provided are integrated with the ongoing function of the line ministry. This is frequently not the case when assets are created as part of public works programmes, in isolation from the ongoing planning and functioning of the social sector line ministries.

#### 8.3 Public Works as Provider of Social Services

The use of public works to create social as well as physical assets is one of the most innovative aspects of public works programming to have developed in the region in response to the needs of OVCs and households affected by HIV/AIDS. This response has developed spontaneously in southern Africa in recognition of the need to support social infrastructure in the context of high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates and the growing pressure this is placing on existing service providers. Public works provision of social services is focussing on Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) and Home Based Care (HBC) (also called Home Community Based Care (HCBC) in South Africa). Within the region, it is primarily Community Based Organisations (CBOs), Faith Based Organisations (FBOs) and national Red Cross organisations which have developed social service programmes in response to the growth of the HIV pandemic, starting from the objective of increased service provision, rather than employment. In South Africa, this approach has been incorporated into the national public works programme (the Expanded Public Works Programme, or EPWP), with the dual objective of offering employment while also providing improved service delivery. This approach is particularly attractive as a public works employment option, since it offers an opportunity to provide sustained part-time employment as well as meeting a recognised social need. Such programmes have the potential to absorb large numbers of workers through increased funding to the NGO or CBO sectors, and with the roll out of VCT and ARVs throughout the region, the needs for para-medical and social support are likely to increase further.

#### 8.3.1 The Zimbabwe Red Cross HBC programme

The Zimbabwe Red Cross Home Based Care (HBC) programme has been in operation since 1992 and offers a well-developed illustration of the potential for the objectives of public works employment and service provision to be addressed jointly. The HBC programme is one component of an integrated range of inputs offered by the Red Cross for those affected by HIV/AIDS, including food distribution and agricultural support. The HBC facilitators are particularly welcomed in communities where health sector personnel are scarce, due to both emigration and mortality resulting from HIV/AIDS; for example, one qualified nurse may oversee up to 20 clinics, resulting in a system which is heavily dependent on Primary Care Nurses with limited medical training.

The programme employs over two thousand HBC facilitators, who work with the households of those affected by HIV/AIDS, sharing skills and experience on basic care, and offering pyscho-social support to those who might otherwise be socially excluded and marginalised. It is estimated that a total of 40,000 people benefit from the support offered by the Red Cross HBC programme. The facilitators work a minimum of four hours a day, for three days a week, although many work considerably more than the stipulated twelve hours a week in the course of their duties, being on call to their communities around the clock. The HBC facilitators visit between ten and fifteen households each week, and their key activities are:

- Training family members in care
- Basic nursing
- Infection control
- Communication about HIV and care
- Monitoring the condition of the patient
- Diagnosis and referral
- Identification of OVCs
- Sharing information on basic drug compliance, side effects etc
- Promoting community ownership and support
- Networking with other service providers

For those requiring a greater degree of assistance, volunteer care givers support the work of the HBC facilitators, offering daily domestic care in the form of bathing, cooking, cleaning etc.

The facilitators are selected by their own communities, they are almost exclusively female, unemployed, and with minimal education. Many are personally affected by HIV/AIDS, either being sick themselves, caring for a terminally ill relative, or having lost a family member to AIDS, and in this way, they have direct experience of the difficulties and stigma faced by their clients. The facilitators need not be educated, although basic literacy and numeracy is useful in order to monitor drug compliance and prepare records, with illiterate volunteers having to work in partnership with a literate colleague. The facilitators receive one month of formal theoretical training and up to a month on practical attachment before qualifying. Prior to qualification, they are given a written test to ensure their competence, and for the illiterate, the test is given verbally. In contrast, HBC training is often carried out 'on the job' among CBO and FBO workers.

#### 8.3.1.1 Voluntarism and remuneration

There is debate within the region, and even in different areas within countries as to whether HBC work should be voluntary or paid. In many cases, the distinction between the two is unclear, with HBC 'volunteers' receiving a 'stipend' in place of a formal wage.

Given the demands on the HBC facilitators volunteers, and their significant time commitment to the programme, the Red Cross believe that their work is ceasing to be 'voluntarism' and that some form of compensation for their time is required. The Red Cross response to the dilemma is the provision of a package of material and cash inputs, see box below, which is comparable in value to food or cash based public works in the country.

#### Remuneration in the Zimbabwe Red Cross HBC Facilitator Programme

- a uniform (two dresses, one jersey, pair of shoes, raincoat)
- a bicycle
- monthly household food ration
- HBC certificate
- protective equipment (gloves t-shirt)
- approximately US\$6 cash per month (Z\$60,000), to cover hygiene inputs (soap, shoe polish etc)\*
- \* As of June 2005. With the current hyperinflation this sum is no longer sufficient to cover the intended commodities.

However within the region, there are concerns regarding the introduction of formal payment for HBC workers. The Zimbabwe Red Cross itself is concerned to preserve the spirit of voluntarism and fearful of damaging the nature of society in terms of a person's religious and/or social obligation to help those in the community. Beyond this, concerns were raised that payment might create divisions and resentments within the community, that it could create the 'wrong' motivation for providing community service, and that programmes might risk collapse if funding were interrupted or suspended. These concerns have led to a range of different solutions to the question of remuneration. Within the Red Cross programmes in Zimbabwe and Malawi, a package of remuneration, which approaches a wage in value is offered, while the HBC facilitators are still known as 'volunteers' in keeping with the Red Cross ethic. This package is higher than remuneration in most other CBOs or FBOs offering HBC services. Elsewhere in the region, either a full wage or 'training allowance' is paid (as in the EPWP in South Africa), or strict principles of voluntarism are adopted, as in some C-SAFE HBC programmes, and the majority of HBC programmes in Malawi. Within the Red Cross Zimbabwe programme, and the C-SAFE regional HBC programme, programmes are implemented with a degree of flexibility to reflect local preferences in terms of voluntarism and/or formal paid remuneration for HBC activities.

The critical question is to identify the point at which households or the wider community no longer bear the increased burden of care resulting from HIV/AIDS, and at this point how can additional assistance be offered? While communities can cope with the burden of care, the role of the outside donor is to assist communities to perform social duties more effectively by offering inputs such as health kits and training. When the point is reached that the community can no longer absorb the burden of care, without detriment to their own livelihoods activities, then it is appropriate to consider some form of external remuneration.

#### 8.3.1.2 Quality of service provision and national coordination

There are estimated to be more than fifty organisations, many very localised, offering HBC in Zimbabwe alone, comprising primarily faith based organisations and community based organisations. A national HBC Focal Point has recently been recruited by the National AIDS Council, and there is hope that this will lead to a mapping of HBC service providers in order to identify which programmes are being implemented where by whom. Currently this information is not known. During the late 1990s, there was an attempt to standardise HBC practices by the National AIDS coordination programme, and excellent training materials were developed (Zimbabwe Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, 2004) however currently there is little monitoring or standardisation and the quality of service provision varies significantly between service providers, reflecting the highly variable training received by workers. There is clearly a need for leadership and coordination in this area in order to address issues of coverage, quality, and training. Demand for care far exceeds the services available from the Red Cross and other service providers, and the main constraint to increased service provision is financial.

The Zimbabwe Red Cross HBC programme offers urgently required care and support to those affected by HIV/AIDS. The programme is a community based, community owned, and relatively cheap form of service provision which reduces the stigma related to HIV/AIDS and increases the confidence of families who learn to care for sick members, while also enabling workers to manage their own sick relatives better. However, the programme experiences some key constraints: the volunteers are stretched thinly among client group and OVCs, leading to low levels of coverage, HBC facilitator turnover is relatively high (up to 40% per annum) due to opportunities in the

health sector (public and private) and HIV/AIDs related sickness, funds for the replenishment of kits (gloves etc) and maintenance of bicycles are limited, undermining service performance, and the limited availability of funds for material support for OVCs (uniforms and school fees leading to drop outs), is a source of frustration for the facilitators, which some managed to address by linking with other service providers able to supply material inputs.

#### 8.3.2 The Social Service Component of the EPWP in South Africa

In South Africa, the need for an extension of social service provision combined with the recognition that the sector had the potential to absorb a large amount of labour has led to the inclusion of social service provision in the national Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) launched in 2004. This provides the opportunity to meet social needs while also increasing employment and raising skills levels.

The major focus of the EPWP is physical asset construction using labour based approaches, which accounts for 70% of the employment planned under the programme, while the social service provision component accounts for only 13%, or 180,000 jobs. These jobs will be created within the Social Cluster of line ministries, (Health, Education, and Social Development) in the areas of Home Community Based Care (HCBC) and Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD), with the objective of extending the outreach of social service provision.

The programme is based around a more formal training model than in Zimbabwe or Malawi, involving multiple year accredited training modules. Social sector workers are employed for up to two years in the EPWP, during which time they are offered a stipend and training, and it is hoped that subsequently they will move into NGO, private, or state sector employment. The programme will be supported by a significant additional state allocation to social cluster line ministries of up to ZAR 7 billion (US\$1.1 billion). The programme's success and the subsequent employment of EPWP graduates in HCBC and ECCD is contingent on ongoing and expanding state funding of NGO activity in the social sector, and is in many ways similar to a public sector employment programme.

#### 8.4 Social Sector Conclusions

Both the Red Cross HBC programme and the EPWP Social Sector programme have the benefit of offering sustained income transfers to workers, while also offering a social service; matching growing social needs with the large supply of unemployed labour. For this reason, both programmes have the potential to have a significant and sustained social protection impact on workers and their families, leading to preventive, and possibly also promotive or transformative social protection outcomes (see section 3.2). While HBC and ECD interventions have been most extensively developed within the region to date, there are opportunities to expand public works employment into a wide range of social sector interventions, where currently unmet demand for services is inhibiting access to support by OVCs and those affected by HIV/AIDS, while at the same time high levels of un- and underemployment and poverty are present in the same communities. The range of areas where there is potential for public works employment within the region include the support of ARV roll out, VCT service provision, TB sputum sample collection and delivery, birth registration, and a range of social grant registration and application services. This area offers a great opportunity to expand socially constructive employment in public works programmes.

There are however a number of limitations and concerns relating to social sector public works employment. The first is that access to employment in such programmes is likely to exclude the labour constrained, unless programmes are designed on a part-time basis, as in Zimbabwe, the marginalised, and also the illiterate and innumerate. Hence these programmes may not be appropriate for targeting social protection transfers to the poorest and most marginalised.

The second key concern relates to the quality of service provision. In the absence of an effective national coordinating mechanism, myriad HBC service providers are operating with little quality control or impact assessment in Zimbabwe. In this unregulated environment, training and service provision are highly variable, and there are concerns that a similar situation could be arise in South Africa unless quality, as well as quantity, becomes a key focus of the EPWP HCBC and ECCD programmes. Equally there are concerns that in the absence of functioning supervisory structures in the health care and education sector, there is a risk that poorly trained HCBC and ECCD workers could work to the detriment, rather than benefit of OVCs and households affected by HIV/AIDS. In the light of these concerns, there is a need for coordination and support to such programmes if the potential for benefits of both service provision, and sustained employment are to be realised.

There is a role for UNICEF in promoting and supporting innovations in public works programming which provide social rather than physical infrastructure, in order to promote a more creative response to the challenge of finding constructive ways to absorb labour. Solutions which address not only the absorption of labour, which as was argued above is often problematic, but also ensure social service provision for the vulnerable, address social protection from two directions simultaneously, and UNICEF has a potential role in promoting this new approach to the public works labour requirement.

# 9. PROGRAMMES LINKING PUBLIC WORKS TO HIV/AIDS SUPPORT INTERVENTIONS

The potential to use the structures of public works programmes to channel support services to public works employees, often in remote or otherwise inaccessible communities, has been recognised in a number of programmes around the region. This was a spontaneous response by programme managers who recognised the needs of households affected by HIV/AIDS and OVCs, and the opportunity to use the community groups formed to implement public works as structures through which to channel various HIV support services. During the implementation of their Urban Public Works Programme, in Addis Ababa during the early 2000s, CARE recognised the opportunity to use community groups formed for public works for IEC and social development initiatives. Subsequently CARE's urban public works programmes were terminated, but similar community groups are now being mobilised explicitly as channels to address issues related to HIV/AIDS IEC and to promote access to HIV support services.

Programmes around the region have promoted access to a range of service providers offering support such as VCT, ARVs, HBC, social services, and condom distribution.

The Working for Water programme in South Africa linked its workers to ECD service providers for their children, even going so far as training and funding ECD providers to extend their crèche services in project areas. The Zimbabwe Red Cross HBC facilitators linked their clients and OVCs to state social services, where these were able to offer support, and the range of DAC funded CBO service providers in the area, as did the Malawian Red Cross who also informed village committees of the presence of OVCs and ensured that they were registered for support in order to access whatever resources might be available in the area. Likewise Zibambele programme staff in South Africa worked to assist their workers to access grants for which they were eligible from the Department of Social Development, while the Gundo Lashu Programme also in South Africa, promoted IEC, condoms and access to VCT through local CBOs.

Public works interventions themselves are not able to offer the range of services needed by OVCs and households affected by HIV/AIDS, nor would it be desirable for them to do so, since it would be neither appropriate nor cost effective, being far removed from their core mandate. However, a recognition of the support needs of workers and their households and the opportunity offered by public works organisational structures channel support from service providers in the area is feasible, and could have a significant impact on households affected by HIV/AIDS. The successful implementation of such an initiative depends on the active engagement of public works staff in supporting their workers and knowledge regarding support interventions available locally. The EU/Government of Malawi Income Generating Public Works Programme is an example of a programme which switched from exclusively addressing livelihoods through public works in its first five years, to explicitly attempting to support OVCs and link workers affected by HIV/AIDS to service providers in the area in its second five years, in response to the perceived needs of the workers.

# 9.1 Key Role for Agencies in Promoting Linkages

The availability of information mapping available services and active CBOs is essential if public works programmes are to incorporate HIV service provision into their activities, since if public works programme staff are not aware of resources available in the area, they are less likely to make the necessary linkages. This suggests a key role for governments or donor agencies in mapping and sharing information on service providers and promoting linkages between CBOs and NGOs funded by NAC and other donors and agencies implementing public works programmes. In some countries in the region, such as Zimbabwe, there is little information on the availability of HIV/AIDS and OVC service provision around the country, and there is a recognised need for investment in mapping service coverage to inform government and donor planning. In others such as Malawi, where UNICEF has recently funded the compilation of a national inventory of CBO and NGO OVC service providers, there is an opportunity actively to share this inventory with public works programme implementers to promote linkages and access to support services for public works employees and their households.

In the case of Working for Water, the public works programme directly subsidised HBC service provision and provided training and resources for local CBOs providing HBC services, highlighting the mutual benefits possible from coordination between two agencies offering different forms of social intervention.

### 10. PROGRAMMES INCLUDING IEC ACTIVITY

In this report, the term Information Education and Communication (IEC) is used to include all interventions promoting information sharing, including social mobilisation and peer education. Almost half of the programmes reviewed included some form of HIV/AIDS related IEC, although research indicates that for some implementing agencies, this may have been a nominal rather than real engagement with IEC, with the IEC component included primarily as a consequence of donor pressure rather than any real commitment to addressing HIV/AIDS. It is notable that almost all WFP public works programmes in the region include IEC, in response to the potential negative HIV impact of food trucking, population movements and changed social structures often experienced in public works environments. WFP programmes target different groups in different contexts, reflecting both the relative operational autonomy of WFP, and differing cultural contexts, with the public works employees in some instances being the major targets for IEC, and in others the focus being on the truck drivers bringing food.

A variety of techniques were used in the region to promote IEC; posters, drama, discussion, campaigns to promote VCT, and even programmes which integrated HIV/AIDS awareness into workplace Health and Safety procedures to ensure mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS awareness among workers and contractors. Experience from the region indicates that an IEC component can easily be integrated into the implementation of public works programmes. UNICEF and/or UNAIDS could play a role in supporting or promoting the inclusion of such components in mainstream public works programmes, which are not currently sensitive to such issues.

However, it may be that IEC interventions alone are not sufficient to have a significant impact on HIV/AIDS. In Malawi the 2004 Demographic and Health Survey indicated an extremely high level of knowledge about HIV transmission and infection vectors. This has led public works programme implementers in the country to question whether the promotion of IEC in their programmes is adequate, since the high prevalence rate suggests that while Malawians may be familiar with the causes of HIV/AIDS, they are not able to respond to this knowledge in terms of behaviour change. The challenge is to identify other key constraints to behaviour change, such as condom accessibility and affordability, which could be addressed by linking public works employees with other HIV related NGOs and CBOs offering for example free condoms, VCT or ARVs, rather than continuing to focusing exclusively on IEC.

# 11. CRITICAL ISSUES IN PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES

Having reviewed each of the different approaches which has been developed in the region to address HIV/AIDS and OVCs in public works programmes, a series of critical issues have emerged which are relevant both in terms of their impacts on the social

protection outcome of these programmes, and also the broader debate about criteria for the selection of appropriate social protection instruments in general. These issues are;

- Dependency
- The wage rate
- Cash or food
- Inclusion and exclusion errors

Each issue is discussed below.

# 11.1 Dependency

A concern regarding 'dependency' has led to a generalised rejection of the use of grants, either conditional or unconditional, as social protection options in a number of countries in the region, and contributed to the preference for public works programmes with their work requirement. This concern about dependency is widely shared in the region, among governments and donor agencies, and is in part related to a fear that the distribution of unconditional grants will undermine the work ethic, with a negative impact on productivity, ultimately rendering citizens reliant on state 'hand outs'. In Ethiopia, there is also a concern that conditional grants, such as those offering incentives for households to ensure that girl children participate in schooling, will have a negative impact on citizenship, since good citizens would in any case ensure that such actions took place, and should not be rewarded for this lest future behaviour patterns are adversely affected. This position is not however widely shared within the donor community, or by other governments within the region.

The term 'dependency' is widely used in the region without further elaboration, and with little empirical evidence or analytical clarity. The ideological and theoretical underpinning of 'dependency' in the social protection discourse has been explored by Meth (2004), and both DFID and ODI have recently carried out research into this issue which has resulted in the finding that there is a critical difference between 'dependent' populations, and the concept of 'dependency' as frequently mentioned by donors and governments (see for example Harvey and Lind, 2004). The argument is that a population may be dependent on external support due, for example, to the inability of land to support them, but they are not necessarily exhibiting 'dependency', as it is often invoked, in terms of a state a state of mind which will induce them to fail to take responsibility for their own livelihoods.

The reality of these concerns regarding grant dependency, and the attendant negative labour supply, productivity and social behaviour outcomes has been widely challenged internationally. There is no reason to suspect that grant based transfers would be any more dependency-inducing than for example public works interventions. In addition, given the delays and frequent interruption of resource flows which characterise both grant and public works programme implementation, for a household intentionally to depend on grants (or public works employment) as their key survival strategy, would be unlikely.

Notwithstanding the lack of empirical evidence to support them, concerns about 'dependency' represent a barrier to the implementation of grant based social protection systems, be they conditional or unconditional, and for this reason in many instances public works remain the ideologically preferable alternative, even where the implementation costs may be significantly higher.

## 11.2 Wage Rate

The wage level has a significant bearing on the social protection impact of a public works programme, and within the region these were found to vary significantly, implying very different anticipated social protection outcomes. In some cases, the selection of a wage level offers an immediate dilemma, in that where limited resources are available for a programme, an increased wage implies fewer beneficiaries. However, this trade-off is not frequently the key determinant of a wage, which tends to be informed by a range of factors, ranging from social protection to ideology.

Malawi offers a particularly extreme example of wage variation in the public works sector, with wages ranging from R43 in the MASAF programme to R200 in the recently developed Ministry of Transport programme (US\$0.36 and US\$1.67 respectively). Within public works programmes, many workers are paid on the basis of a task rate, rather than a daily wage, which typically equates to four or five hours of work. For this reason, it is sometimes argued that public works remuneration should be set at 4/7 (or 4/8) of a prevailing or minimum daily wage, and this is the rationale for the extremely low MASAF wage. However, where alternative employment opportunities are not available, the public works wage forms the total income available to participating households.

If considered in terms of the social protection transfer, rather than in terms of an hourly pro-rata share of the prevailing or minimum wage, the problematic nature of such a reduced transfer becomes apparent. The tension between the adoption of a pro-rata share of a minimum wage, and desired social protection outcomes in a public works programme is clearly illustrated by the MASAF case; by using a pro-rata share of the minimum wage, the programme offered a daily wage which represented less than one half of average household subsistence needs, even after own production was taken into account (McCord, 2004b). Setting a wage on this basis is clearly problematic and can be at odds with the social protection objectives of a programme.

Interestingly, for the WFP, the objective of public works programmes is to ensure food security, rather than pro-rata parity with prevailing wage rates, and the wage is calculated accordingly on the basis that 20 days of work will ensure an adequate ration for a family of five. This is very different from the wage in programmes such as MASAF, and for this reason in Malawi in August 2005, WFP public works programmes were paying an effective wage which on an hourly basis was twice that of the MASAF programme (the value of the WFP food basket was approximately US\$0.80 per task, compared to US\$0.43 per task under MASAF). In 2004, the Malawian government made an attempt to harmonise the public works programme wage across the country and move towards its calculation on the basis of desired social protection outcomes rather than a pro-rata share of the prevailing/minimum wage. However this attempt was not supported by the World Bank who preferred to retain the market based wage, notwithstanding the social protection trade off this implies.

These ongoing discrepancies in Malawi highlight the diversity of perceptions of the role of the wage in public works programmes among government and donor agencies in some countries in the region, and stand in contrast with the situation in other countries such as Ethiopia, where a single daily wage (task) rate (ETB6 (US\$0.75) or 3kg grain), calculated on the basis of household consumption needs, is adopted throughout the country by all implementing agencies.

In Ethiopia, the PSNP wage is not designed to ensure asset protection or accumulation, but serves to address immediate food security needs. It is anticipated that medium-to long-term food security and livelihoods benefits will result from the improved quality and livelihoods impact of the assets created under the PSNP, and also the range of complementary interventions included in the broader Food Security Policy, which together will increase the potential for participants to 'graduate' out of poverty. This indicates that the use of public works to provide sustained social protection benefits is contingent on the implementation of both quality infrastructure and complementary interventions.

This insight offered by the PSNP is critical for the region, as often ambitious social protection objectives are ascribed to public works programmes, when it is only the adoption of an adequate wage, in combination with a range of other interventions that can offer the possibility of sustained livelihoods benefits.

If the objective of a programme is poverty reduction and the provision of a safety net, then offering a low wage may have serious social protection trade-offs (Devereux 2000). Clearly this represents a dilemma, which may entail a rethinking of public works wage-setting orthodoxy, both in terms of the theory, and also in programme design, where the maxim of setting a wage at or below the prevailing norm tends to dominate social protection considerations.

#### 11.3 Cash or Food

The choice of cash or food as the wage in public works programmes remains highly contested, with donors such as USAID and WFP continuing to support primarily Food for Work programmes, reflecting the nature of the commodities they are able to access, while other donor agencies with the flexibility of offering cash in place of food are arguing for the shift to cash based programmes wherever possible. The Ethiopian PSNP has recently endorsed the principle that cash may be preferable to food as the payment medium within a public works programme, reflecting international social protection policy recommendations, and is currently altering the balance of its wage payment away from the traditional dominance of food based payment in favour of cash. The challenges faced in implementing this shift offer lessons for the region.

The primary arguments underlying the shift from food to cash are, i) that cash is superior to food in terms of stimulating the local economy with greater second round effects, ii) it allows beneficiaries a choice in how the payment is used, without the costly and inefficient individual monetisation of a proportion of food payments to enable cash transactions for necessary purchases of non-food household items and services (e.g. education), iii) it prevents the suppression of the local economy and stimulates the market in food grains, iv) the risk of depressing local price and production of food is reduced, and v) ease of delivery and reduction of costs.

These arguments are central to recent developmental thinking in terms of avoiding some of the major economic distortions associated with food based public works. However, they are insensitive to the primary caveat in the cash/food debate, which is that the superiority of cash over food only holds in situations where food availability, access and affordability are not compromised. In Ethiopia, where there is a perennial structural food deficit of significant proportions, markets are undeveloped, and in certain regions there are endemic production problems due to adverse climatic

conditions, the rapid shift from food to cash for work may be problematic. This situation is exacerbated by the non-availability of systems and staff (e.g. cashiers) to implement the process of cash distribution.

In theory, the roll out of the PSNP is sensitive to the issues of food availability, price fluctuations and inflation, but notwithstanding this sensitivity, year on year maize prices rose more than 70% in mid 2005, suggesting that given the structural food deficit, the major reduction in food inflows with the ending of the EGS Food for Work programme, and the increase in demand for cash, purchased food is a contributor to food cost inflation. It is likely that the situation is exacerbated by the rapid, rather than phased, adjustment from food to cash introduced in the PSNP, as the market needs time to respond in terms of providing adequate commercial supplies. The response to the food inflation has been a marginal increase in the share or workers receiving food rather than cash transfers, but despite this adjustment, the public works cash payment of ETB 6 is no longer equivalent to the 3kg per capita daily wage, and is in need of upward revision if the level of nutritional support anticipated under the PSNP is to be maintained.

The conclusion which can be drawn from this is that in situations where food is either not accessible or affordable, there is a significant benefit in bringing food to poor communities. The value of Food for Work programmes is particularly clear in situations of hyperinflation and major market distortion, such as Zimbabwe, where food shortages and non-functioning markets make access to food a major problem. However, the major drawback of an exclusively food based wage is that no cash is available to meet other household needs, such as education which was perceived as a more urgent need than food among some beneficiaries in Zimbabwe, who argued that wild foods could be substituted for food based wages, whereas there was no substitute for the cash required for school fees. The implication is that depending on the circumstances, a combination of the two forms of wage payment may be optimal in terms of social protection outcomes.

#### 11.4 Exclusion Errors

Exclusion errors may be defined as the exclusion from participation in a programme of some among those who meet the programme criteria. Such errors are predictable if the number of participants included in a public works programme is less than the number of those in need of support. In the case of public works programmes, this leads to the rationing of employment, with only some of those eligible managing to gain employment, and the result is gaps in the social protection net. This is problematic if the programme is the primary social protection provision in a particular area, be it a district, province or whole country, as it leaves some members of society without effective support. In the case of Ethiopia, the total of 5.1 million beneficiaries budgeted in the PSNP may be inadequate in terms of the actual numbers affected by chronic food insecurity. While the PSNP includes a 20% contingency, which may provide funds to extend the programme to meet some of the additional demand in the medium term, it is likely the PSNP will not be able to function as a comprehensive source of social protection unless additional budget provisions are made. Currently it is anticipated that food insecure households not supported under the PSNP should be covered under the pre-existing EGS, which will offer emergency support, a safety net to a safety net, funded by year on year donor appeals. This problem of a discrepancy between the scale of a public works response, and the scale of the need for social protection is prevalent across the region, and the implication is that there is a need for some form of

safety net back up for those not included in a public works social protection intervention.

An additional practical factor contributing to exclusion error is the inability of communities to absorb labour on the scale planned under a public works programme in good quality public works, a problem encountered in a range of programmes around the region, ranging from the PSNP in Ethiopia, to the EPWP in South Africa. In many instances it may be hard to identify sufficient numbers of labour intensive activities in a given district to absorb the population of chronically food insecure households, a situation which is likely to engender the creation of poor quality or non-strategic asset creation, since the labour absorption requirement of a social protection-oriented public works programme is bound to dominate over the issues of asset quality.

Coverage may also be inconsistent in a nationally implemented public works programme, as it is difficult to implement programmes in areas of highly disbursed settlement with pastoralist or nomadic populations. For these groups in particular the risk of exclusion is high, and public works may not be an efficient response to their social protection needs, requiring an alternative intervention to be implemented.

# 12. THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC WORKS

### 12.1 Public Works Programme Budgets

Throughout the region, an assessment of the real cost of public works programmes has proved difficult. Determining the cost of public works programmes requires significant budgetary analysis, access to detailed programme management information, and in many cases information which was not held by programme implementers. In the case of Food for Work programmes for example, food inputs are often considered 'free' by implementing agencies. As a result the costs of food purchase, shipment and transportation are often not included in calculations of programme cost and have to be reconstructed from estimated data if total programme costs are to be ascertained.

Another complicating factor is that public works programmes frequently form one component of larger integrated programmes, and budgets are not disaggregated by programme component. Examples of this are the Zimbabwe Red Cross HBC programme which is part of a larger integrated rural livelihoods support programme, and WFP public works programmes in the region, which are not differentiated from other kinds of intervention (free distribution etc) in the agency's country budgets. This creates difficulties in identifying and allocating management costs across the range of interventions, and hence makes any comparable costing of programmes problematic and reliant on heroic assumptions. For these reasons, assessing the cost effectiveness of public works programmes is itself highly problematic, and renders any form of cost-based policy selection difficult.

#### 12.2 Cost Effectiveness

While the cost of public works programmes is difficult to ascertain, and in many instances is not known to programme managers themselves, the value of the benefits created is equally unclear.

In order to evaluate the cost effectiveness of public works programmes accurately, it is necessary to identify the benefits they create, both in terms of their immediate social protection benefits, accruing from the wage transfer (food, cash or agricultural inputs), the training or skills development transfer (where this was part of the programme), and critically, the value of the physical or social asset created by the programme. To omit any one of these outcomes of a public works programme is erroneous, and any cost comparison with alternative forms of social protection intervention which fails to include a consideration of the asset created is problematic.

However, programmes reviewed were almost all unable to furnish evaluations of either i) the socio-economic impact of the wage transfer in the short- or medium- term or ii) the quality, durability and socio-economic impact of assets created in the medium term. This reflects a limited engagement in investigating the impact and cost effectiveness of public works programmes on the part of governments, donors and implementing agencies, in terms of their function as instruments for providing a social protection wage transfer, taking into account the value of the asset created and its socio-economic impact. Hence with limited data on both the cost and the impact side of the equation, any rigorous assessment of the cost-effectiveness of public works programmes as instruments of social protection is highly problematic, rending it difficult to draw significant conclusions regarding the impact or cost effectiveness of physical (or social) infrastructure based projects.

While considerable quantitative research has been carried out on the social protection impact of public works in the South and South East Asia region, (see for example Dev, 1995, or Datt and Ravallion, 1995) a similar critical body of work has not developed in sub-Saharan Africa. Detailed evaluations of the immediate social protection benefits of the wage transfer in the region are few in number, with notable exceptions being recent work in South Africa, (see for example work by IFPRI, Adato, Haddad, Horner, Ravjee and Haywood, 1999, or Haddad and Adato, 2001, and McCord, 2004a), and the current Rapid Assessment of Poverty Impacts (RAPI) study being piloted in Ethiopia to assess the micro-economic benefits to communities of road construction (see Murphy, 2000 and Mengesha and Osei-Bonsu, 2005). In addition there has been some work in this area by the ILO in relation to the EIP over the last decade, but this has not tended to focus in detail on the social protection impact of wage transfers and the assets created.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> An extensive medium term qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the impact of the C-SAFE programme was completed in mid 2005, but this was not disaggregated by programme component, and hence it was not possible to identify the results of the public works programme in isolation from the other programme components.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> An initial survey has been carried out which will be used as a baseline against which to assess future programme impacts. This formal attempt to assess the micro-economic impact of public works is unusual in the region and important in attempting to promote an evidence base for future social protection programming, however as in other similar studies, the limitation of this research is the short time line within which benefits are assessed. The evaluation will select the pre-construction and immediately post construction periods, rather than capturing anticipated sustained food security benefits accruing for example several years after programme implementation (see Mengesha and Osei-Bonsu, 2005).

Overall, there has only been a limited examination of the value of the wage in relation to the social protection outcomes anticipated by donors and programme implementers, and only a limited literature interrogates the social protection impact of public works, (see for example McCord, 2004b, or Devereux, 2000). Critically, there have been few evaluations of the medium- to long-term impacts of public works, and a summary of those which had been carried out on the ILO EIP led to the conclusion that:

'...expectations may not have been realistic, long-term effects of EIPs are diverse and complex and do not necessarily have a strong poverty alleviation effect... A number of EIPs has [sic] experienced problems relating to sustainability of outputs and may not be producing tangible benefits and impacts..... the long term impact on poverty alleviation needs to be more fully documented' (Keddeman, 1998: 28-9).

One innovative attempt to evaluate medium-term socio-economic impacts is a study by CARE Malawi which attempts to evaluate the social change processes resulting from the public works intervention, (Scharff, 2005), but this research stands alone in this area, and quantitative analysis of the medium-term socio-economic impact of assets created through public works remains elusive.

There is a similar lack of evidence on the impact of public works programmes on economic growth, with the exception of some initial work by CARE Malawi (2004), and McCord and van Seventer (2004) on South Africa, for whom the results are inconclusive.

There remains an urgent need to assess the medium- to long-term socio-economic impact of public works programmes in order to appraise their effectiveness as instruments of social protection. Without an evaluation of the social protection and the socio-economic value of the assets created, the selection of public works over alternative forms of social protection remains problematic, given the opportunity cost implications of using a work based approach to social protection.

All that can be said with confidence about the cost effectiveness of public works programmes is that they have a high cost of transfer relative to transfers carried out in the form of cash grants, often 40-70% of total cost (administration, technical, managerial, and material costs), compared to 10-30% for unconditional transfers. The international literature suggests that public works programmes may be highly inefficient as an instrument for providing social protection transfers, compared to a direct transfer system, *unless* the assets created have high socio-economic value (Murgai and Ravallion, 2005). Given the limited focus on the quality of assets created in most public works programmes in the east and southern Africa region, it is not clear that the assets created in the region do have a high socio-economic value, and hence there may be reason for concern about the efficiency of public works as an instrument for social protection in the region.

# 12.3 Evidence Based Policy Choice

Given the lack of evidence on both the cost and impact of public works programmes, the conclusion must be drawn that the selection of public works over alternative social protection instruments is not currently based on evidence on impact, cost effectiveness

or sustainability. The selection of public works is more likely to be driven on the part of both governments and donors by a preference for familiar social protection approaches, political concerns, and sometimes also ideological concerns, relating to the desire to retain work a requirement in return for social assistance, in order to address issues of dependency and self targeting. Compared to social protection offered through grant transfers mechanisms, public works incur high implementation costs both for the donor, in terms of high cost per dollar transferred, and also for the beneficiary, in terms of activities foregone as a result of the work requirement. If the arguments from India are applied to Africa, it may be that public works are not an effective instrument for delivering social protection, however, given the current lack of data, it is not possible at this time to draw such a conclusion for the south and eastern Africa region.

# 13. PUBLIC WORKS, SOCIAL PROTECTION AND HIV/AIDS: SOME CONCLUSIONS

The discussion above has illustrated that there is not an evidence base in the region which endorses public works as an effective social protection instrument. However, it is important to note that such evidence is also lacking in relation to many of the alternative instruments adopted in the region. It is clear that public works play a major role in current social protection interventions throughout the region, and it is likely that they will continue to do so over coming decades, with considerable donor funds and government resources continuing to be directed at these interventions.

Most public works programmes in the region currently play a limited role in terms of the social protection for OVCs and households affected by HIV/AIDS, and work requirement at the heart of public works programme design mean that many are in practical terms excluded from their benefits. However, the innovations in public works programming outlined in this report, which have occurred in response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the region, indicate that there may be a number of significant opportunities to increase the social protection impact of public works programmes on vulnerable children and their households.

Of the different options, some entail an improvement in the quality of basic public works programme design and implementation such that the anticipated social protection benefits are more likely to be achieved, others entail an imaginative redesign of public works and their linkage with other development programmes to promote synergy, recognising the opportunity public works offer to access the working poor, while the most radical entails a rethinking of the labour absorption component of public works, shifting from mass employment in the creation of physical infrastructure creation, to mass employment in social infrastructure construction, recognising the current urgent, and for the most part unmet social needs within communities. This approach matches high levels of available labour with the urgent need for service provision in the context of HIV/AIDS. Experimental programmes carried out by the Red Cross, C-SAFE and the national public works programmes in South Africa indicate some of the learning around this new approach. The provision of social rather than physical infrastructure through public works also offers the possibility of addressing one of the most serious problems in public works which has constrained some of the most well developed programmes in

the region, such as the Ethiopian PSNP, namely the difficulty of absorbing massive numbers of workers on meaningful construction enterprises. This shift in focus to the provision of social rather than physical infrastructure would also be consistent with the constructive use of increasing funding flows from the Global Fund, the demands of the anticipated roll out of ARVs, and the decimated health sectors in many countries in the region. This approach may be considered as public sector employment, since it would be an expanded public or NGO sector which would be absorbing the expansion of health personnel, but such an exercise would not be conceptually different from the absorption of labour into public road construction programmes, and would still fit comfortably into the definition of public works outlined at the start of this report;

all activities which entail the payment of a wage in return for the provision of labour, in order to i) enhance employment and ii) produce an asset, with the overall objective of promoting social protection.

The innovations outlined in this report can be promoted by an active engagement on the part of the government and donor community in order to i) give critical inputs to existing programmes to make them more effective social protection instruments, ii) promote a critical assessment of and debate around the social protection impact of public works, and iii) promote evidence based policy choice.

Within conventional public works programmes, this will entail changes in design to take into account the economics of social protection and ensure that transfers are adequate to contribute to programmes' social protection objectives. This will also imply giving significant weight to micro-economic and developmental considerations as well as to engineering considerations.

## 13.1 Integrating HIV/AIDS into Public Works Programmes

While all public works programmes offer opportunities for the integration of HIV/AIDS related components, HIV/AIDS is not addressed in any way in the majority of programmes in the region. The reasons for this are diverse, but focus around three main issues, lack of capacity, the 'tyranny of the urgent', and lack of knowledge. These are briefly discussed below.

Many agencies implementing public works programmes, both governmental and civil society based, face a range of capacity constraints in the everyday operation of their programmes, relating to financial, material and human resources. This is particularly the case where governmental decentralisation has recently taken place, and a heavy administrative and executive burden has fallen onto local or district authorities, which is common throughout the region. In this context, any requirement to add additional programme components or mainstream additional programme issues into ongoing programmes represents a significant additional burden, which is likely to be deprioritised. An example of this is the recent decentralisation of MASAF implementation to district level, which significantly reduced the capacity of District Staff to deliver on non-core programme components.

A related issue may be described as the 'tyranny of the urgent', with implementing agencies focusing on rolling out the core programme, (asset selection and design, recruitment, and implementation) rather than extending its scope to include 'add on' programme components. It was this situation which led to the failure of attempts to integrate HIV/AIDS in the CARE ILTPWP component of the MASAF programme in

Malawi, in combination with the decentralisation process outlined above. Another example of this is the tension experienced during the first year of the PSNP in Ethiopia between ensuring that immediate employment opportunities were identified for up to 5 million workers, and the desire to improve the quality of assets created under the programme and integration with other developmental initiatives. Failing to roll out the programme in a timely way would entail the risk of major food security problems within the country.

The third major issue, which feeds into the two outlined above, is the lack of practical knowledge on the part of programme managers and implementers regarding how to integrate HIV/AIDS into public works programmes. The question of the failure to take HIV/AIDS and the needs of OVCs into account in public works programme design and implementation was explored in the case study countries, and throughout the region, the response was that there was uncertainty as to how, in practical terms, to address this issue in a meaningful way.

It is hoped that this publication will in some way address this concern, by sharing innovations around the region. There are also other practical resources available, most notably the documentation created under the C-SAFE programme, see section 6.1, and the recent *Guidelines for HIV/AIDS Interventions in Emergency Settings*, produced by the Inter-Agency Steering Committee (IASC, 2004). These guidelines offer advice on practical programme innovations to incorporate HIV and AIDS into interventions relating to food security, nutrition, and targeted food inputs, and as such are directly relevant to many public works programmes throughout the region.

### 13.2 The Role of the International Community

This report has highlighted a number of examples of ways in which the international community in general, and UN agencies concerned with HIV/AIDS and OVCs may offer support to public works programme development and implementation. The main areas for support are the promotion of conceptual innovations within the arena of public works programming, the promotion of linkages and synergies between programmes in place of the myriad parallel interventions which tend to characterise the development and social protection sectors within the region, the harmonisation of donor inputs, and working with governments to support the development of unified social protection strategies. Such inputs would help to address the fundamental problem affecting social protection generally within the region, the disparate range of fragmented interventions currently being implemented. Some examples of interventions which would address these issues are set out below.

While many agencies may have specific HIV/AIDS programmes, those implementing large public works programmes, such as MASAF and USAID, are in many instances missing the opportunity to promote HIV/AIDS activity with their workers. For example, UNAIDS could assist by linking UNAIDS trained CBO staff with public works programme designers and implementers in order to assist in the adoption of good practice guidelines as set out in the IASC document in programme design. UNAIDS has trained trainers in ways to integrate such programmes into emergency programmes, and this could easily be applied to public works. There is a widespread problem in terms of free condom accessibility, despite UNAIDS efforts to promote distribution. Public works programmes could be used as a mechanism to deliver condoms to large numbers of the working poor in rural areas. If UNAIDS were to assist public works programme

implementers such as MASAF, the EU and USAID partners to work with UNFPA and associated NGOs working on condom distribution, this would offer an additional channel for reaching the poor. Given the increasing availability of ARVs, VCT is becoming a more viable and attractive option, and in the light of this, UNAIDS could work with public works programme implementers in a range of ways, such as facilitating mobile VCT programme visits to public works sites, and the development of the required support programmes.

Public works programmes have the potential to become an additional channel for reaching the rural poor. By offering practical support and assistance, major donors in general, and UN agencies such as UNAIDS in particular could play the role of a catalyst in bringing advice and technical inputs to public works programmes at the development stage, while also linking ongoing public works programmes with specialist NGO service providers. In this way, public works can be seen as a means to assist agencies concerned with HIV/AIDS and OVCs to achieve their core mandate, and extend their reach to new populations, rather than separate, isolated social protection interventions.

## 14. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. Critical analysis of public works as instruments of social protection
- In order to assess the efficacy of public works programmes as instruments of social protection and inform evidence based policy choice, there is a need for a more critical engagement with public works programming throughout the region. The debate would benefit from an increased interrogation of costs and impacts in order to assess the social protection performance and cost effectiveness of public works interventions.
- 2. Promotion of a developmental approach to public works

Where sustained social protection and the promotion of livelihoods promotion is the goal of public works programme, there is a need for multiple year programmes which are linked with other development interventions, recognising the limited potential of public works programmes implemented in isolation. The PSNP in Ethiopia, and IGPWP and I-LIFE programmes in Malawi are experimenting with this approach, but it is not widely reflected in government and donor thinking in the region.

3. Wage level to be consistent with social protection objectives

Remuneration needs to be consistent with objectives and the anticipated social protection outcomes of public works interventions, and in order to facilitate consumption smoothing and beneficial livelihoods outcomes should be sustained rather than short term and once off.

4. Ensure public works programmes are not a loose-weave safety net

There is a risk that social protection based on public works may exclude many of the vulnerable. In order to address this, the scale of intervention must be sufficient to minimise exclusion errors within a given area, complementary free distributions or complementary social protection interventions are needed alongside public works programmes in order to ensure the needs of labour constrained households are addressed, and programmes should be designed to promote the participation of vulnerable households.

#### 5. Provision of quality infrastructure, physical or social

If the work requirement is used to create physical infrastructure, this infrastructure should be of adequate quality to contribute to social protection outcomes. The creation of social infrastructure should be considered as an alternative in the context of high HIV/AIDS prevalence.

6. Promote the impact of public works on OVCs through access to service delivery There is an opportunity to link public works programmes with the HIV/AIDS and OVC services provided by CBO and governmental service providers at a local level. This does not require changes to the design of public works programmes, but only the facilitation of linkages with other agencies.

This would require a review of HIV service delivery initiatives in each country, which would encompass an analysis of which agencies are offering what services and where, the quality of services offered, and the range of approaches adopted. This is particularly important in the light of the anticipated roll out of ARVs and the increased demands this will place on the sector. The development of shared policies, standards and evaluation processes would contribute to this process.

In addition to facilitating links between public works programmes and OVC service providers, there is also scope for supporting the expansion of social service delivery based public works programmes where necessary; through the implementation of pilot programmes, the direct funding of CBOs, and investment in training and quality assessment.

7. Promote the evaluation of the social protection impact of public works Finally, there is a need to support public works programme implementers in the critical evaluation of their programmes in terms of the impact on the social protection of OVCs and those affected by HIV/AIDS. The social protection impact of public works in general tends to be poorly monitored, and analysis of the impact on OVCs and those affected by HIV/AIDS is currently extremely limited. There is a need to promote this analysis as an integral component of programme implementation.

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# **Appendix 1 Summary of OVC and HIV/AIDS Public Works Matrix**

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Angola	Development Relief in Angola	Food for Work	Physical infrastructure rehabilitation. Restore livelihoods	Africare, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children (US) and World Vision	USAID	2003			Increase awareness of HIV/AIDS	IEC
Angola	Protracted Refugee and Displaced Person Food for Work/Food for Assets Projects	Food for Work	Assist resettlers to restore livelihoods to meet their basic subsistence requirements. Assist in the rehabilitation of productive and social infrastructure in areas of resettlement and in previously inaccessible areas severely affected by war.	Local Government, national NGOs with technical support from the World Food Programme	World Food Programme	1995			Projects 10054.1 and 10054.2 mention HIV/AIDS awareness as components of their FFW and FFA programmes.	IEC
Botswana	Drought Relief Programme	Cash for Work	Combat food insecurity Social and physical infrastructure construction; roads, grain processing, cooking at local schools	Government of Botswana	World Food Programme, USAID, Govt of Australia, Canada	1992	1998	60,000 – 90,000 per annum		Complementary
Botswana	Remote Area Development Programme (RADP)	Food for Work	Improving the standard of living of that part of the rural population which lives outside the established and recognised villages.	Government of Botswana	NORAD	1978	ongoing		Free food for AIDS orphans and anti-retroviral drugs for people with HIV/AIDS.	Complementary
Burundi	Multi-sector Project for Socio-economic Reinsertion	Cash for Work	Contribute to the socio- economic insertion of disadvantaged groups by creating jobs through labour- intensive work for building infrastructure and improving access to social services such as health, education and living conditions.	Technical secretariat of the Public Works and Employment Creation project (PWEC) Bujumbura, Burundi	African Development Bank	2005	2009	3,400 per annum	Links with other programme components: HIV testing, counselling and NGO development. Training in management and preparation of SMMEs and nonprofit associations working on HIV/AIDS. Facilitate access to funds to promote community initiatives, rehabilitate and equip medical centres for HIV/AIDS testing and counselling	Links to services
Burundi	Rwanda Returnee Rehabilitation Programme	Food for Work		Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), UN programme of HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the World Food Programme (World Food Programme)	World Food Programme				Includes an AIDS component in that the project partners work on establishing the extent of the need for food assistance in families affected by HIV/AIDS	Complementary free distribution

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Burundi	Public Works and Employment Creation Project	Cash for Work	Contribute to the peace process and physical reconstruction of Burundi through generation of productive labour-intensive employment	Ministry of Public Works and Equipment	World Bank			Scholland Co	A separate component will address HIV/AIDS, which includes a community information and education programme aimed at vulnerable groups (eg construction workers, inter-city truck drivers, seasonal workers, displaced people, prostitutes) in localities where PWPs are being implemented	IEC
Burundi	Food Aid for Relief and Recovery in the Great Lakes Region	Food for Work	Food for IDPs and refugees. Infrastructure rehabilitation. Agricultural production. Water systems management. Land reclamation. Reafforestation. Shelter construction	Government ministries, World Food Programme, World Bank, UNICEF, UNAIDS	World Food Programme				Programme includes an AIDS component with project partners establishing the food assistance needs in families affected by HIV/AIDS	Complementary free distribution
Ethiopia	Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) cash for work scheme	Cash for Work	Employment generation. Road construction. Environmental protection. Asset protection. Reduce vulnerability to drought	Ethiopian Red Cross Society with support from the International Federation	Ethiopian Red Cross Society	2000		62,000 per annum. 82,900 from May 2003 pending Government of Ethiopia's (DPPC) re- assessment of needs		Complementary free distribution
Ethiopia	Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP)	Cash for Work/Food for Work	Provide transfers to the food insecure population in chronically poor insecure woredas in way that prevents asset depletion at the household level and create assets at the community level.  Simultaneously the programme aims to support rural development, prevent long term consequences of acute short term consumption shortages, promote household production and investment and promote market development by increasing purchasing power	Food Security Coordination Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development	Multiple agencies, including DFID and EU	2005	2010	5.1 million per annum	Programme may lead to increased risk of transmission therefore IEC components included. Also Complementary free distributiondistribution programme to assist those unable to work due to chronic illness (approx 20% of budget)	IEC, Complementary free distribution
Ethiopia	Managing Environmental Resouces to Enable Transitions to more sustainable livelihoods(MERET)	Food for Work	Improve food security in the most food insecure areas throughout Ethipoia, through conservation and development of agricultural lands afffected by severe land degradation and lack of basic infrastructure.	World Food Programme and Ministry of Agriculture	World Food Programme and Government	1999	Ongoing	1.4 million		Indirect

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Ethiopia	Urban Public Works Programme	Food for Work	Provide basic infrastructure (roads) and primary services (latrines) to marginal urban communities in Addis Ababa, provide short-term employment opportunities in the form of food-for-work to the un- and underemployed residents of these communities, enhance the capacity of community groups to participate in future self-help development endeavors	CARE		1993	2000		Community groups formed in this programme (Multi-Purpose Infrastructure Development Committees or MPIDCs) recognised as potential channels through which to address HIV/AIDS related issues	Indirect
Ethiopia	Boricha Rehabilitation and Development Project	Food for Work	Improved nutritional status at household level. Improved natural resources management in sustainable way. Improved awareness of the communities in health and sanitation.	Meserete Kristos Church (MKC) Relief and Development				5,000		Complementary free distribution
Ethiopia	Emergency Relief Assistance/ Shebedino Woreda	Food for Work	Improvement of soil conservation and erosion control measures, wood resource management and environmental control measures. Improved workload of women by making available firewood at nearby village through forestation. Improved maize crop production through availability of agricultural inputs – fertilizer & seed. Improved food availability and income through higher crop yield (environmental improvement, access to firewood, higher crop yield)	Meserete Kristos Church (MKC) Relief and Development	Mennonite Central Committee & United Church of Canada		June 2005	15,500 (including free distribution)	Food distribution is aimed at those households unable to work. Indirectly this is probably aimed at HIV affected households, but not explicitly or exclusively	Complementary free distribution
Ethiopia	Food For The Hungry International food for work programme	Food for Work	Increase crop production via sustainable farming methods in order to increase the capacity of the land to support local residents - save lives by reducing distress sales and depletion of household assets and preventing the migration of many household members from their farms. (increase crop productivity, prevent household asset depletion)	Food For The Hungry International – Ethiopia	Christian Reformed World Relief Committee. Supported by United Church of Canada, Mennonite Central Committee Canada, Presbyterian World Service & Development	2004	2006	41,967 (including free distribution)	Food distribution for households not able to work	Complementary free distribution

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Ethiopia	The Rift Valley Children and Women Association (RCWDA) Food for Work Programme	Food for Work	Endure the current crisis without selling off of assets and come out of it better prepared to work towards self-sufficiency.	Rift Valley Children and Women Association (RCWDA)	Oxfam America			Control		Complementary free distribution
Ethiopia	The Relief Society of Tigray (REST) food for work	Food for Work	Mitigating and stabilizing the effects of severe drought on household food security, while at the same time building public assets and ensuring the continuation of farmers' productivity.	The Relief Society of Tigray (REST)	Italian government (financing) & ILO (technical assistance)	1997	Ongoing	1,238,950 in 2005 (68% of local population)	Complementary free distribution programme to assist those unable to work due to chronic illness	Complementary free distribution
Ethiopia	Save the Children US food for work	Food for Work			USAID / FFP	July 2002	June 2007	84,000		Complementary free distribution
Ethiopia	Save the Children US food for work	Food for Work			USAID / FFP	July 2002	June 2007			Complementary free distribution
Ethiopia	Kucha Emergency Food Aid Project	Food for Work	Save lives, especially children under 5-years. Reduce the food deficit and malnutrition by 20%. Protect livelihoods. Create community assets through the food-for-work	Ethiopian Kale Heywet Church Relief and Development Department	Evangelical Missionary Church of Canada Supported by Christian and Missionary Alliance	July 2002	2005	1,484 (including free distribution)		Complementary free distribution
Ethiopia	Kucha Drought Response	Food for Work	Save the lives of people at risk, create community assets though implementation of employment and consequently build food security in the long run (reduce vulnerability to food shortages)	Ethiopian Kale Heywet Church (EKHC)	Evangelical Missionary Church. Supported by: Adventist Development & Relief Agency, Canadian Baptist Ministries, Christian & Missionary Alliance, Christian Reformed World Relief Committee of Canada, Presbyterian World Service & Development, The Salvation Army, World Relief Canada	February 2003	August 2003	3,118 (including free distribution to the elderly, lactating women, female- headed households)		Complementary free distribution

Country	Title of programme/	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Ethiopia	Tigray Rural Roads Periodic Maintenance	Cash for Work	Maintenance of rural roads. Capacity building of contractors and beneficiaries (road agency, preparation of contract docs, maximize utilization of avaliable	Ethiopian Roads Authority	WB, IDA	March 2003	August 2005	beneficiaries 1,500	IEC	IEC
Ethiopia	Ethiopia Rural Travel and Transport Programme	Cash for Work	resources).	Ethiopian Roads Authority	DFID, DCI (Ireland) & ILO Technical Support			2,000	Contractors are trained in HIV IEC and required to pass on to workers	IEC
Ethiopia	World Food Programme EMOP 10030, 10030.1, 10030.2 and 10030.3 Relief Food Assistance to Small-Scale Farmers and Drought-Affected Pastoralists	Food for Work and Food for Assets	Rebuild physical infrastructure in order to promote accumulation of household assets, thus ensuring that the long-term vulnerability of households does not increase.	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) and communities	World Food Programme	2001	2004	780,137 (2004)	HIV/AIDS awareness training to be provided to all drivers of transport companies used by World Food Programme. Phase one will take place in Djibouti, for drivers of long haul trucks.	IEC
Ethiopia	World Food Programme 10127.1 & 6180 Food Assistance for Refugees in Ethiopia and for Repatriation	Food for Work	Provide food to communities surrounding the camps in the form of FFA. This will enable food-insecure families to produce assets for sustainable livelihoods.	World Food Programme, UNHCR, The Government of Ethiopia's Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA)	World Food Programme	2000	2006	5,500 (host communities ) 1,400 (refugees)	World Food Programme will hold informal information sessions about HIV/AIDS prevention at food distribution points	IEC
Ethiopia	World Food Programme PRRO 10362 Enabling Livelihood Protection and Promotion	Food for Work	Provide FFA in districts where food insecurity is predictable, undertaken by able-bodied beneficiaries in chronically foodinsecure communities	Government of Ethiopia, World Food Programme	World Food Programme	2005	2007		HIV/AIDS awareness training for 3,000 transport workers and will develop a policy to make training mandatory for all transporters.	IEC
Ethiopia	Koisha	Cash for Work	Provide a reliable supplement to existing coping strategies and to develop infrastructural assets which could generate and raise incomes in the long term	SOS Sahel		1992	1999			Complementary free distribution
Ethiopia	Legambe	Cash for Work	Include labour based public work as one component of an integrated programme including promotion of markets and diversification, in order to promote sustainable livelihoods	Save the Children (UK)	Dutch Government	2005		46,000		Indirect
Ethiopia	Meket	Cash for Work	Provide cash relief (as opposed to food) to vulnerable populations to meet their immediate needs, stimulate local markets and the economy through the cash distributions, and learn lessons about linking relief with development and child nutrition support.	Save the Children (UK)		2003	Ongoing	70,000		Service provision

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Kenya	World Food Programme Country Programme 10264	Food for Work, Food for Training	Promoting education through school feeding, assisting people affected by HIV/AIDS and foodfor-asset (FFA) activities	World Food Programme	World Food Programme	2004	2008	57,800	HIV/AIDS is a core components of the programme. Food is to serve as an income transfer and incentive for mothers, caregivers and healthy family members to attend training in HIV awareness.	IEC
Kenya	World Food Programme Emergency Operation 10374 Food Assistance to Drought Affected People in Kenya	Food for Work	FFW will help to build assets to improve food security and mitigate the effects of future droughts.	Districts	World Food Programme UNICEF			56,000	FFW is integrated with HIV/AIDS awareness and able bodied members of HIV affected households are encouraged to participate in the FFW programme	IEC, Employment
Kenya	Machakos Integrated Development Programme	Food for Work		Food Resource Bank Implementing Member Christian Reformed World Relief Committee	Food Resource Bank	2002	2004/5		Training of the community on HIV/AIDS prevention and care of the affected/infected	IEC, Service Provision
Kenya	World Food Programme Protracted Relief and Recovery Programme 10258.0 "Food Assistance to Somali and Sudanese Refugees"	Food for Work	Targeted food aid will be provided to offset food needs of refugees in camps	World Food Programme	World Food Programme	October 2003	September 2005	4,369	Activities include HIV awareness at distribution sites, establishing support systems and providing health care facilities.	IEC, Service Provision
Lesotho	Labour Intensive Urban Upgrading Programme	Cash for Work and Food for Work	Establish a labour-based unit within the Maseru City Council's works department to use local resources and labour wherever possible and to train technical personnel in labour intensive programme implementation	Maseru City Council		October 2000	December 2002	5,000	Women in the co-operatives are involved in HBC with the support of LBU	Service provision
Lesotho	Empowering Communities in Development Planning	Cash for Work and Food for Work	Mainstreaming HIV / AIDS in the local government sector, support to use of labour base approaches, developing partnerships for development policy, capacity building of community based organisations.	Maseru City Council	United Nations Development Programme and Government of Lesotho	October 2000	December 2002	40	Women in the co-operatives are normally invovled in home based care with the support of LBU to reduce poverty.	IEC
Lesotho	Pontseng FFW	Food for Work	Facilitate small scale irrigation for vegetable production	DORCAS AID	World Food Programme & Implementing Partner	September 2004	June 2005	104	Due to the high rate of HIV AIDS infection, it is planned to implement HIV AIDS workshop for FFW participants	IEC
Lesotho	Lifelekoaneng in Mafeteng FFW	Food for Work	Environmental management	World Food Programme	World Food Programme	September 2004	April 2005		Most participants are carers of orphans and elderly vulnerable people	Employment
Lesotho	Ha Sekhohola Community project	Food for Work	Soil conservation vegetable production	DORCAS AID	World Food Programme & DORCAS AID	October 2004	May 2005	92	It is planned to implement HIV AIDS workshop for FFW participants	IEC

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Lesotho	Malefiloane Literacy & Numeracy Programme	Food for Learning	Literacy Programme	Lesotho Red Cross and Lesotho Distant Teaching Centre	World Food Programme & GROW NGO	October 2004	March 2005	263		Service provision
Lesotho	Nightingale Primary School Kitchen and Storeroom Construction.	Food for Work	Create a school kitchen and storeroom. School feeding programme	Senior Education Officer and SSFRU of Ministry of Education at district level and World Food Programme cooperating partners	World Food Programme	November 2004	April 2005	50	Partners carry out basic HIV/AIDS IEC in schools	IEC
Lesotho	Abia Donga Control	Food for Work	Soil conservation for productive vegetable production	DORCAS AID, MCC, Rural Water Supply, Disaster Management Authority	World Food Programme (part of PRRO)	June 2004	December 2005	220	A pilot IEC FFT project with Positive Action is to be implemented	IEC
Lesotho	World Food Programme PRRO 10310 Assistance to populations in Southern Africa vulnerable to food insecurity and the impact of AIDS	Food for Work	Support for households affected by HIV/AIDS to establish and maintain productive and human assets	C-SAFE and Oxfam	World Food Programme	June 2004	2007	2,000	Low labour intensity activities selected. Care and counselling services also provided	Employment, Service provision
Lesotho	Home Community Based Care (HCBC) component in the Sexual Health and Rights Promotion (SHARP)	Cash for Work (incentive)	Provide caregivers with sufficient information, skills and support to enable them to protect and promote the health of people living with terminal illnesses including AIDS. Enable caregivers to provide compassionate care to the terminally ill Protect and promote the health of the caregiver Enable the sick to live their lives with dignity and respect	CARE Lesotho-South Africa with CBOs	CARE Africa Fund, Bristol- Myers Squibb Foundation, Food for the Hungry International, USAID	2002	2004		This projects is based around offering support to people with HIV/AIDS	Service provision
Malawi	Government of Malawi / European Union Public Works Programme: Forestry Component	Cash for Work	Develop sustainable fuel wood, poles and timber supply, provide a valuable resource for the community and trees for interested individuals, assist in soil and water conservation	GoM / EU PWP	European Union	April 2001	July 2005	85,500	Employment deliberately includes households affected by HIV/AIDS or with OVCs of the chronically ill One day training on HIV, gender and rights included in all programmes	IEC, Employment
Malawi	Government of Malawi / European Union Public Works Programme: Irrigation Component	Cash for Work	Develop sustainable localised food security, improve agricultural production, nutrition and income, assist in soil and water conservation	GoM / EU PWP	Eurpean Union	April 2001	July 2005	6,576	Employment deliberately includes households affected by HIV/AIDS or with OVCs of the chronically ill One day training on HIV, gender and rights included in all programmes	IEC, Employment

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Malawi	Government of Malawi / European Union Public Works Infrastructure Programme: Roadworks Component	Cash for Work	Improving district feeder roads andbridges and maintaining previously rehabilitated roads	GoM / EU PMU	European Union	April 2001	July 2005	32,500	Employment deliberately includes households affected by HIV/AIDS or with OVCs of the chronically ill One day training on HIV, gender and rights included in all programmes	IEC, Employment
Malawi	Government of Malawi / European Union Income Generation Public Works Programme (IGPWP)	Cash for Work	Contribute to poverty reduction by promoting sustainable increases in productivity. Enhance the socio-economic situation of the rural/peri-urban population through improving accessibility, infrastructure and promotion of productive activities and by creating linkages to economic activities, while also addressing HIV/Aids, gender, environmental issues, institutional development and capacity building.	GOM / EU PMU	European Union	2005	2011		Linkages will be facilitated between the beneficiary communities and HIV/AIDS programmes and initiatives so that comunities derive benefits from these as well. The village clubs will form fora for HIV/AIDS programmes to engage with communities forming a channel through which support can be directed	Complementary free distribution, Employment, IEC, Links
Malawi	Consortium for Southern Africa Food Emergency (C -SAFE II) Project	Food for Work	Improve health, access to food and the nutritional status of vulnerable communities	Malawi Red Cross Society	American Red Cross Society	October 2002	September 2003	2,400	AIDS education - people are presented with AIDS awareness messages through local performances at venues distributing food rations.	IEC
Malawi	Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) Public Works Programme (Community Demand Driven Programme, or CDP)	Cash for Work	Increase the stock of socio- economic assets on a sustainable basis, transfer cash incomes to poor and vulnerable households and enhance participatory development management capacities at community and district levels	District Assemblies	World Bank	November 2003	December 2006	110,000 (cumulative from January 2004 to August 2005)	IEC, but only for Projet Management Committees	IEC
Malawi	Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) Emergency Drought Response Programme	Cash for Work	Emergency drought relief	District Assemblies	World Bank	March 2005	March 2006	105,000		IEC
Malawi	Improving Livelihoods through Public Works (ILTPWP)	Cash for Work		CARE Malawi	DFID/MASAF	October 2002	March 2005			IEC
Malawi	Comprehensive Response to Disaster Emergencies (CORDE)	Cash for Work	Drought recovery through improvement of water availability and wetland utilisation; improvement of rural road infrastructure and raising agricultural productivity through crop diversification under irrigation practices.	CARE Malawi	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation	November 2002	March 2004	3,010	Households affected by chronic illnesses were given free winter seed.	Complementary free distribution

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Malawi	Sustaining Productive Livelihoods through Inputs For Asset (SPLIFA)	Agricultural Inputs for Work	Participating retailers store, distribute inputs and provide farmers with instructional messages in accordance with guidelines provided. Participating farmers use inputs following proper methods. Beneficiaries have improved access to and increased use of services	CARE Malawi	DFID	July 2003	July 2005	6,000 year one, 14,000 year two	Impact of HIV was taken into account thus 10% of chronically ill beneficiaries received free inputs. Orphan-headed house holds were also targeted	Complementary free distribution
Malawi	Improving Livelihoods Through Food Security (I-LIFE)	Food for Work	Agricultural development, moving farming households away from subsistence towards commercial agricultural production and miproving nutritional and health practices to support sustainable livelihoods. Increasing agricultural production, improving nutrition and health, and increasing district capacity	Save the Children US, Emmanuel International, Africare, Salvation Army, CARE CRS, American Red Cross, World Vision	USAID	October 2004	October 2009	12,000 per annum in PWP component (est)	Link made between PWP and other community initiatives, eg HBC.	Links
Malawi	CSAFE	Food for Work	Increase nutrition status of vulnerable groups; increase productive assets of vulnerable groups	INGO Consortium	USAID	November 2002	September 2004		Project targeted 10% of free food beneficiaries from households with chronic illnesses	Complementary free distribution
Malawi	World Food Programme Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 10310 Assistance to Populations in Southern Africa Vulnerable to Food Insecurity and the Impact of AIDS	Food for Work	Emergency food security	World Food Programme (World Food Programme), and INGOs (Goal, World Vision International, Oxfam, Emmanuel International, Salvation Army, Concern Universal)	World Food Programme	January 2005	March 2006	236,000 (est)	The project involves activities to support food-insecure households affected by erratic climate, orphans and families affected by HIV/AIDS	Complementary free distribution
Malawi	World Food Programme Emergency Operation Programme 10290 The Targeted Relief to Vulnerable Households in Southern Africa	Food for Work	Promote productive livelihoods, prevent severe food shortages for households not yet recovered from the shocks of the past two years; protect and build human and productive assets, and provision of safety net.	16 World Food Programme NGO Cooperating Partners	Different donor agencies including governments	January 2004	December 2004	90,000 (est)	Households affected by HIV/AIDS were targeted for inclusion in FFW where one member can work. Particpants of FFW activities have been encouraged to share benefits of assets created with households affected by HIV/AIDS e.g. fruit tree seedlings; FFW communal garden crops. Those unable to work were given free food distribution.	Employment Complementary free distribution
Malawi	Ministry of Transport Emergency Programme	Cash for Work	Provide rural employment and incomes to purchase food and susbsidised fertilisers, while also creating road infrastructure	Ministry of Transport	Government of Malawi and EU	July 2005	July 2011	10,000 per annum	n/a	Indirect

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
	project	Continu		implementing agency	ranang agency			beneficiaries		· ypology
Malawi	Malawi Red Cross HBC Programme	Cash and Food for Work	Provide HBC and promote sustainable livelihoods for those affected by HIV/AIDS	Malawi Red Cross Society	American Red Cross and World Food Programme	2000	Ongoing	528	Offer HBC services, referal to VCT and ARV clinics, assist in formation of self help groups, link OVCs with Village Orphan Committees	Service provision Links
Mozambique	Government Road Construction	Cash for Work	Maximize local employment opportunities; enforce Core Labour Standards; provide opportunities to local sub-contractors; implement a programme of HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention activities within the workforce.	Mozambique National Road Administration [Administração Nacional de Estradas (ANE)]	DFID	2001 (August)	2003 (April)	600	Population Services International (PSI) was subcontracted to address HIV/AIDS, including IEC on HIV prevention, the promotion of voluntary counselling and testing, the training of peer counselors, and the sale of condoms. The focus on the HIV/AIDS component of the project extended to post-project research on the effect on participants' attitudes.	IEC
Mozambique	Urban Livelihoods Programme	Cash for Work	Improvement of basic services provisions (water, waste disposal, and drainage) in flood affected areas	Municipal Council of Maputo with private construction company	CIDA Canada via CARE	2000			Youth groups use dancing and drama as tool for communication about HIV/AIDS	IEC
Mozambique	Home Based Care Programmes (HBC)	Cash for Work	Provide basic healthcare to those unable to access the understaffed health system. Educate those with HIV/AIDS on the side-effects of ARV's as well as the necessity to keep to the strict treatment regimen. Counselling. Education on prevention of transmission	National and international non-governmental organisations implement different programmes regulated by national health officials	Multiple agencies	2002	Ongoing		Provide basic healthcare to those unable to access the understaffed health system. Educate those with HIV/AIDS on the side-effects of ARV's as well as the necessity to keep to the strict treatment regimen. Counselling. Education on prevention of transmission	IEC, Service provision
Rwanda	World Food Programme 10062.1 Food Aid for Relief and Recovery in the Great Lakes Region	Food for Work and Food for Training	Training in life skills and rights as citizens of Rwanda for women's associations, student groups and newly elected community leaders.  Addressing structural poverty to promote livelihoods, providing infrastructure including irrigation, roads and environmental protection.	World Food Programme in coordination with UNDP	World Food Programme	February 2003	January 2006	1,429,400 (monthly average at 141,000)		Complementary free distribution
South Africa	Expanded Public Works Programme (Infrastructure Cluster)	Cash for Work	Employment Upgrading of road and other infrastructure Shifting from capital to labour intensive infrastructure provision Development of Labour Intensive Construction (LIC) methods	National Department of Public Works, District & Local Municipalities	Government	April 2004	April 2009	150,000 per annum (700,000 over 5 years)	1 day lifeskills training per month to include HIV	IEC
South Africa	Expanded Public Works Programme (Social Cluster)	Cash for Work	Employment Training of HBC workers HCBC and ECD service provision	Ministries of Health, Education and Social Welfare, Government of South Africa	Government	April 2004	April 2009	150,000 over 5 years	Services to be provided to PLWHA	Service Provision
South Africa	Gundo Lashu Public Works Programme	Cash for Work	Employment creation Contractor development Livelihood promotion	Roads Authority Limpopo	Government	2001	Ongoing	5,500 (est) 2003	HIV IEC included in lifeskills training	IEC

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
South Africa	Zimbambele Rural Road Maintenance Programme	Cash for Work	The creation of sustainable job opportuities for poor rural families through the maintenance of rural roads	KZN Department of Transport	Government	2000	Ongoing	23,450	Employment contract specified to allow for substitution if worker is sick or passes away	Employment, Links
South Africa	Working for Wetlands Programme	Cash for Work	Facilitate the conservation, rehabilitation and sustainable use of wetland ecosystems and to promote employment and livelihoods	South African National Biodiversity Institute incollaboration with the Department of Water Affairs	Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT)	July 2004	March 2007	1,850	The programme has HIV awareness, counselling and peer education programmes which are compulsory for workers, and also targets PLWHA for employment	IEC, Employment
South Africa	Working for Water	Cash for Work	Maintain ecological integrity, enhance water security, restore the productive potential of land, optimise the social benefits of this work, and develop economic benefits from the clearing of invasive alien plants	Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF)	Government	October 1995	Ongoing	32, 000	HIV/AIDS education is ongoing, using a peer education approach, to encourage HIV positive people to participate. The programme also provides IEC on HIV/AIDS. This programme also integrates projects on Early Childhood Development, Primary Health Care and nutrition, ABET, through the PWP framework in support of the workers	IEC Employment Sevice provision Links
South Africa	Working on Fire	Cash for Work	Create jobs and opportunities for labour-intensive fire-protection (fire fighting, fuel reduction and fire prevention) Develop skills, capacity and social upliftment in poor communities.	Forest Fire Association	Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF)	2002	Fixed term Contract expires April 2007 - likely to be renewed	760	HIV/AIDS training is provided for all workers.	IEC
South Africa	Bambisanani Home Based Care Project	Cash for Work	Coordinate services with government, businesses, NGOs, health care workers and volunteers, establish training for HBC and social service providers, and ensure the needs of vulnerable groups (PLWHA, women and children) are addressed.	The Equity Project	USAID	1999	2006		The project provides Home-Based Care to HIV/AIDS patients and training for caregivers.	Service provision, Links
Swaziland	Assistance to Vulnerable Groups in Lesotho and Swaziland	Food for Work	Distribute food aid and related basic support to targeted vulnerable groups		European Community Humanitarial Office (ECHO)	2004			HIV/AIDS IEC activities are included in this project, (drama groups and school campaigns)	IEC, Complementary free distribution
Swaziland	World Food Programme PRRO 10310 Assistance to populations in Southern Africa Vulnerable to food Insecurity and the Impact of AIDS	Food for Work	Provide food for work, training and education, and support for orphans and families affected by HIV/AIDS to promote recovery of assets following the 2001–2003 drought. FFW and foodfor-training (FFT) aim to establish productive and human assets	Consortium for Southern Africa Food Security Emergency (C-SAFE) partners World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Save the Children and Oxfam.	World Food Programme	2005	2007		Due to HIV/AIDS the nature of the work, and the assets selected entail low intensity activities. The PRRO will support families whose food security is compromised by HIV/AIDS, for example those caring for a chronically ill person or coping with the death of a breadwinner.	Employment

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Tanzania	World Food Programme Tanzania Country Programme: Integrated Support for Food Insecure Households Affected by HIV/AIDS	Food for Training	Improve coping capacities and sustained livelihoods among PLWHA and affected populations, improve community care capacity by training volunteers in peer support, counselling and home based care, and enhance short-term food security among PLWHA	NGOs and CBOs	World Food Programme and Government	2002	2006	12,800 PLWHA (skills training and income generating activities), 16,000 community volunteers, 82,125 youths (life skills training)	Entire programme is centred around PLWHA, offering employment, training and HBC	IEC, Service provision, Employment
Tanzania	Mwanza Region District and Feeder Roads Project (DFR)	Cash for Work	Rehabilitate district and feeder roads and establish sustainable capacity to rehabilitate and maintain roads in an efficient manner	District Councils	UNCDF/ UNDP	1998	December 2003	J.	Forming and training HIV/AIDS peer groups and compiling a manual on HIV/AIDS. The HIV/AIDS core group interacted with communities on HIV/AIDS issues at the roadsites where the rehabilitation projects were implemented.	IEC
Tanzania	ITECO transport infrastructure programme Morogoro region	Cash for Work	Support participatory management of the district roads network and promote labour based technology whilst mainstreaming gender in road related activities.	ITECO (contracting agency) through Government	SDC	1981	2003	4,000 (est)	HIV related programmes include: IEC involving cultural dance groups and videos, training of peer educators on prevention, erection of billboards with messages in construction sites and condom distribution.	IEC
Tanzania	Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF I)	Cash for Work	Provision of a temporary social safety net through self-targeting, low-wage, public works projects until the positive impact of the ongoing economic reforms occurs	Tanzanian Management Unit (TMU) in the President's Office	World Bank and Government	November 2000	November 2004	113,646	Provision for HIV/AIDS mainstreaming is integral to the project with the aim of developing HIV/AIDS informed communities through IEC activities using radio programs, folk drama, posters, and newspaper supplements. Also the HIV/AIDS infected (those who could work) and affected were among the targeted beneficiaries	IEC, Employment
Tanzania	Tanzania Second Social Action Fund (TASAF II)	Cash for Work	Sustainable development to improve the livelihoods of the rural poor and improved physical infrastructure, to enhance access to essential public health services	National, regional and village agencies	World Bank, Government, Local Communites	2005	2009		Employment of households with PLWHA	Employment

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Tanzania	Rehabilitation of District and Feeder Roads Project using Labour Based Technology	Cash for Work	Promote economic development and alleviate poverty in selected agricultural and fisheries areas of rural districts in Mwanza region. This is to be achieved through: improving peoples access to economic and social facilities; establishing sustainable capacity within the target districts to rehabilitate and maintain efficiently a core network of district and feeder roads; establishing a roads maintenance system	President's Office Regional Administration & Local Government/ Local Authorities of Mwanza Region	United Nations Capital Development Fund	August 1997	December 2004	12,000 (est)	Awareness created, and people sensitised. Unfortunately an impact study of the finished roads indicated increased HIV incidence	IEC
Uganda	Save the Children Fund Food for Work Project	Food for Work	Decrease vulnerability of poor families	Save the Children		2005	2010		The project includes supplementary feeding to families severely affected by HIV/AIDS and to vulnerable mothers of small children.	Complementary free distribution
Uganda	World Food Programme PRRO 10121.0 Targeted food assistance for relief and recovery of refugees	Food for Work and Food for Training	Targeted food assistance for relief and recovery of refugees Training in HIV care and IEC	World Food Programme (World Food Programme) partnered by World Vision International, HIV/AIDS Support Programme, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) France, Government Agencies	World Food Programme	2002	2005	1,029,415 (all components)	FFT includes HIV care and prevention	Service provision, IEC
Zambia	C-SAFE Zambia Project	Food for Work	Increase resilience to food security shocks among targeted vulnerable households and communities by addressing both immediate acute-food needs as well as long term food security	Consortium for Southern Africa Food Security Emergency (C-SAFE)				22,412	Target vulnerable households including chronically ill. Nutrition and health education includes HIV/AIDS awareness	Complementary free distribution, IEC
Zambia	Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM)	Food for Work	Food relief to drought affected areas	Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC), The Catholic Commission for Development (CCD)	Caritas Internationalis (Rome)	1992		30,830 (including food distribution)		Complementary free distribution
Zambia	World Food Programme PRRO 10310 Assistance to populations in Southern Africa vulnerable to food insecurity and the impact of AIDS	Food for Work		World Food Programme and partners, including World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, SCF, Oxfam					Programme includes HIV care and counselling	IEC, Service provision, Employment

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Zambia	Home Based Care programmes	Cash and Food for Work	Reduce the vulnerability of AIDS affected households to further impoverishment	Numerous, Some include the Catholic Secretariat, the Salvation Army and the Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ)					HBC focusses on HIV/AIDS affected households with regard to their health, nutrition, psychological status and economic status	Service provision
Zambia	Zambia Railways Restructuring Project - Social Mitigation Component	Cash for Work	Improve accessibility of produce from resettlement schemes to markets through feeder road improvement, and to offer employment to retrenched former railways workers as part of the national safety net programme	National Social Safety Net	World Bank		May 2005		HIV Committee takes active role and HIV prevention techniques are promoted.	IEC
Zimbabwe	Small Dams and Community Resources Management Project	Food for Work	Food security; construction of irrigation infrastructure; horticulture	The C-SAFE consortium	DFID	1997	2002		HIV/AIDS affected households, who participated in light productivity work and received FFA rations. Some projects include the construction of houses for the elderly and chronically ill in exchange for food rations.	Employment, Service provision
Zimbabwe	Chabili Field Garden Micro-Project, Beitbridge	Food for Work	Food security; construction of irrigation infrastructure; horticulture	World Vision's C- SAFE team	ECHO, OFDA, FAO				The produce is sold or distributed to the elderly or chronically ill in the community.	Complementary free distribution
Zimbabwe	Food Security Programme	Food for Work	Generate short term employment opportunities for skilled and unskilled workers, increase productive assets among vullnerable communities and households through rehabilitating commmunity infrastructure and increasing resilience to food security shocks among vulnerable communities and households	CARE	USAID	October 2002	September 2005		Creation of assets for PLWHA, and employment of PLWHA	Service provision, Employment
Zimbabwe	Food For Assets	Food for Work	Promote volunteerism of the comunitites cooking for School Feeding Program. Provide food to the vulnerable housholds around schools	Catholic Relief Services	USAID (Food For Peace (FFP))	February 2005	April 2005	800	Cooking time is four hours hence workers can go home early (not in the dark)	Employment
Zimbabwe	World Food Programme EMOP 10200 Southern Africa Crisis Response	Food for Work		World Food Programme, CARE, World Vision, ORAP, Christian Care	World Food Programme	2002	2003		Vulnerable people receive support through targeted HIV/AIDS related activities as a supplement to the Food for Work component	Service provision

Country	Title of programme/ project	Type of scheme	Objectives of programme	Name of implementing agency	Name of funding agency	Start date	End date	Number of direct beneficiaries	Consideration of HIV impact	HIV/OVC Typology
Zimbabwe	World Food Programme PRRO 10310 Assistance to populations in Southern Africa Vulnerable to food Insecurity and the Impact of AIDS	Food for Work	Save lives in crisis situations; protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks; support improved nutrition and health status of children, mothers and other vulnerable people; support access to education and reduce gender disparity in access to education and skills training; help governments to establish and manage national food-assistance programmes	World Food Programme and partners, including C- Safe, World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, SCF, Oxfam	World Food Programme	2005	2007		Direct food assistance so as to decrease the vulnerability to AIDS, education on the prevention of mother-to-child transmission, ARV treatment, counseling and home based care	IEC, Complementary free distribution, Service provision
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwean Red Cross Society Home Based Care Programme	Cash for Work	Provision of HBC to households affected by HIV/AIDS	Zimbabwe Red Cross		1992	Ongoing			HBC, IEC
Zimbabwe	National AIDS Council	Cash for Work and Food for Work	Provision of material, medical and social support to households affected by HIV/AIDS	Range of CBOs and NGOs	UNAIDS, NGOs		Ongoing			HBC, Complementary free distribution

## APPENDIX 2 CASE STUDY INFORMANTS

## **Ethiopia**

#### CARE

Marcy Vigoda, Country Director

#### DFID

Tim Robertson, Food Security Adviser, Melkamnesh Alemu, Food Security Adviser

#### **Ethiopian Roads Authority**

Beteseb Feleke, Technical Adviser, Rural Roads Technical Support Team

#### **European Community Delegation**

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#### Food Security Coordination Bureau

Brahami Zao

#### ILO

Kwaku Osei-Bonsu, Senior Technical Specialist, Employment Intensive Works,)

#### **REST**

Yibrah Hagos, Fund Raising Officer

#### SOS Sahel

Feyera Abdi, Executive Director

#### Save the Children (UK)

John Wyeth, Livelihoods and Poverty Technical Manager

#### UNAIDS

Sinead Ryan, Regional Advisor, Peace and Security

#### **UNICEF Ethiopia**

Richard Mabala, HIV Chief of Office Alemach Teklehaimanet, Project Officer, Health Haile Gashaw, Assistant Project Officer, Water and Sanitation Fikre Negussie, Project Officer, Emergencies

#### **USAID**

Judith Sandford, Safety Nets Advisor

#### World Bank

Assaye Legesse, Senior Agricultural Economist, Rural Development, World Food Programme Yihenew Zewdie, Food Security and Natural Resources Management Analyst

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## Malawi

## CARE

Nick Osbourne Country Director, Francis Lezama Programme Manager

#### Concern World Wide

Fiona Edwards, Country Director

#### **DFID**

Roger Wilson, Director of DFID Malawi Sharon Kinsley, Deputy Director Mulle Chikoko, Social Protection Advisor

## Government of Malawi/European Union Public Works Programme

Arthur Chibwana, National Programme Coordinator George Lwanda, Development Economist, Social Sectors riaan Esterhuizen, Technical Advisor

## Ministry of Transport

Victor Lungu, Director of Transport Planning

#### Malawi Red Cross

Ethel Kaimira, National HIV/AIDS Coordinator

#### **MASAF**

Boniface Kalanda, Director Monitoring and Learning Vincent Sikelo, Assistant Director, LAMPS Ephanita Banda, Assistant Director, Social Support

#### Safety Net Unit, Government of Malawi

Kester Kapahizi, Permanent Secretary Harry Mwalima, Manager

#### **UNAIDS**

Jacqueline Kabambe, National HIV/AIDS Programme Officer

#### **UNICEF Malawi**

Aida Girma, Head of Delegation Mayke Huijbregts, OVC Project Officer Liz Hughes, OVC Programme Manager

#### **USAID**

Mexon Nyirongo, Head of Health, Population and Nutrition Office Abel Kawonga, HIV Project Specialist Autman Tembo, Agricultural Advisor to I-LIFE Programme Kenneth Wiyo, Agricultural Advisor to I-LIFE Programme

## World Bank

Susanne Kramer, HIV/AIDS Mainstreaming Liaison Officer

## World Food Programme

Blessings Mwale, Food Security Advisor Lola Castro, Deputy Country Director

## World Vision

Bryer Mlowoka, Capacity Building Manager

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## South Africa

## C-SAFE

Kate Greenaway, C-SAFE Regional HIV/AIDS Advisor

## Expanded Public Works Programme, Department of Public Works

Mbongeni Mondlane, National Department of Public Works
Sean Phillips, Chief Operations Officer, National Department of Public Works
Maikel Lieuw-Kie-Song, Chief Director, Labour Intensive Specialist, National Department of Public Works

## Gundo Lashu Programme, Roads Authority Limpopo

Mbongeni Mondlane, Former Social Development Advisor

Thabo Mokone, Former Programme Manager

### **IT Transport Limited**

Gary Taylor, Managing Director

## Working for Water, Department of Water Affairs

Guy Preston, Executive Director Mthembeni Khumalo, Research Director Ntombi Makwabe, HIV/AIDS Advisor Tara Appalraju, Social Development Manager

#### **UNICEF South Africa**

Ashley Theron

#### Zibambele Programme, KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport

Glen Xaba, Programme Manager

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## **Zimbabwe**

#### CARE

Abel Whaude, Distrit HIV/IADS Focus Point Person Jeph Mahove, Project Manager/Officer in Charge Elasso Chikani, Project Manager/Officer in Charge Nomsa Gurira, Team Leader Gweru

#### C-SAFE

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#### CRS

Lutful Gofur, Programme Quality Coordinator/Head of Programming Dr Kirk Felsman

## DFID

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#### ILO

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#### UNDP

Stephen O'Brien, Information Management Officer

#### WFP

Mumtaz Osman, Programme Officer HIV/IDS, Nutrition and Gender

#### World Vision

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#### Zimbabwe Red Cross

Emma Kundishora, Secretary General Calvine Matsinde, National Food Security Officer, ZRC Sydney Chinaire, Finance, Admin and Personnel Officer Maxwell Phiri, Manager Gweru Red Cross Community Based Care Facilitators, Maboleni Clinic, Lower Gweru Mr and Mrs Mphovu, HBC clients, Lower Gweru Akim Mphovu, Programme Coordinator, Matabeleland South Azaria Moyo, Community Based Care Facilitator, Gwanda Thandazani Ndlovu, Community Based Care Facilitator, Gwanda Rosemary Phiri, Community Based Care Facilitator, Gwanda Mildred Siziba, Community Based Care Facilitator, Gwanda Thulani Moyo, Community Based Care Facilitator, Gwanda Siabulisine Ndlovu, Community Based Care Facilitator, Gwanda Sizi Ndlovu, Community Based Care Facilitator, Gwanda Ntombenhle Moyo, Community Based Care Facilitator, Gwanda Lizzy Phiri, Community Based Care Facilitator, Gwanda Bessy Ncube, Community Based Care Facilitator, Gwanda Bokelo Nare, Community Based Care Facilitator, Gwanda Mrs Ndludlu and Marjory Ndludlu, HBC clients, Gwanda

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## Institutional

#### World Food Programme

Robin Jackson, Chief HIV Advisor Lynn Brown, Development Policy Officer, PSP Division Ugo Gentilini, Development Policy Officer, PSP Division

## International Labour Organisation

Guy Standing, Director, ILO Socio-Economic Security Programme José de Figueiredo, Senior Economist, Social Protection Sector

#### **DFID**

Malcolm Ridout, Livelihoods Advisor, London Tim Waites, Livelihoods Advisor, London

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This report examines the social protection role of public works programmes in the East and Southern Africa region, in terms of their ability to address the needs of OVC and households affected by HIV/AIDS. It explores whether public works have a role to play in addressing the massive social protection challenges arising as a result of the high HIV prevalence rates in the region, and the growing incidence of OVCs. The report reviews how programmes have adapted in response to the challenge of HIV/AIDS in East and Southern Africa, and the innovations and programme developments which this challenge has stimulated.

## Public Works in the Context of HIV/AIDS

Innovations in public works for reaching the most vulnerable children and households in east and southern Africa - Anna McCord

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